

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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Action

Control: 448

AF Info

Rec'd: MARCH 2, 1958
11:46 A.M.

RMR

FROM: MADRID
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 918, MARCH 2

[Signature]

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12

SENT DEPARTMENT 918, REPEATED INFORMATION RABAT 77, PARIS 59, D.R.
UNNUMBERED, LONDON 65.

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771-022/3-258

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TWELVE HUNDRED WORD ARMY MINISTRY COMMUNIQUE MARCH 1 PUBLISHED
SPANISH PAPERS TODAY REPORTS COMPLETE SUCCESS CLEANUP OPERATIONS
SPANISH SAHARA AGAINST IRREGULAR ARMED BANDS SO CALLED LIBERATION
ARMY WHICH UNFORTUNATELY BEYOND CONTROL MOROCCAN SULTAN, HAD
ATTACKED IFNI LAST NOVEMBER, ALSO INFILTRATING SAHARA PAST FEW
MONTHS AND STIRRING UP NOMADS AGAINST EUROPEANS AND ATTACKING
FRENCH POSTS MAURITENIA AND INTERNATIONAL LIGHTHOUSE CAPE BOJADOR.
SPANISH CLEANUP CAMPAIGN BEGUN FEBRUARY 10 AFTER CONCENTRATION
NECESSARY LAND, SEA AND AIR FORCES AT COASTAL POINTS. IN FIRST
PHASE AIR FORCE PARACHUTISTS AND FOUR MECHANIZED COMBAT GROUPS
FROM EL ATUN ELIMINATED BANDS IN SEQUITA EL HOMRA AREA SOUTH
OF 27 DEGREES 40 MINUTES KILLING AT LEAST 150 ENEMY AND CAPTURING
TWO IMPORTANT MUNITIONS DUMPS AND ONE DEPOT WITH FOUR MONTHS
SUPPLIES FOR 500 MEN, WITH SPANISH LOSSES ONLY THREE KILLED AND
SEVEN WOUNDED. CAMPAIGN ALSO HAD POLITICAL RESULT WHEN MAJORITY
NATIVES SOUGHT PROTECTION SPANISH TROOPS, SOME DECLARING THEIR
OPPOSITION TO AND NON-CONNIVANCE WITH LIBERATION ARMY. IN SECOND
PHASE BEGINNING FEBRUARY 21 FOUR COMBAT GROUPS FROM EL ATUN,
VILLA CISNIROS, GUELLA ZEMMUR AND AGUENTI CLEARED UP BIR ENZARAN-
AUSERD AREA CENTRAL SPANISH SAHARA WITH COOPERATION FRENCH UNITS
FROM MAURITENIA. NATIVE TRIBES SUCH AS REGUBAT AND ULAD DELIM
AGAIN REITERATED EN MASSE THEIR LOYALTY TO SPAIN. ENEMY LOSSES
WERE 64 DEAD COUNTED SO FAR, MANY WOUNDED (SOME OF WHOM EVACUATED
BY SPANISH HELICOPTER), MANY PRISONERS, SUPPLIES, ARMS, MUNITIONS,
MATERIAL AND CAMELS. SPANISH CASUALTIES WERE FIVE DEAD AND 27
WOUNDED INCLUDING THREE OFFICERS. CAMPAIGN ALSO INVOLVED INDIRECT
COOPERATION SPANISH FORCES IFNI WHERE CONSIDERABLE LOSSES INFILCTED
IN ATTACKS

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-2- 918, MARCH 2, FROM MADRID

IN ATTACKS ON PARTISONS STILL STATIONED THERE. COMMUNIQUE CHARACTERIZES LIBERATION ARMY AND PARTISAN STORIES LIKE THAT ABOUT FRENCH AND SPANISH USE OF GAS TO KILL 600 PERSONS AS FALSEHOODS SURPRISINGLY SIMILAR TO COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA. COMMUNIQUE ENDS REGRETTING THAT MOROCCO REPEAT MOROCCO TOLERATES PROPAGATION SUCH FALSEHOODS WHICH CREATE ILL WILL UNFAVORABLE TO THE FRIENDLY RELATIONS WHICH SHOULD PREVAIL BETWEEN TWO NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES CALLED TO COOPERATE IN FAVOR WORLD PEACE.

PRESS TODAY ALSO CARRIES REPORTS FROM RABAT AND AP REPEAT PARIS CONCERNING SPEECH AT HAMID OASIS WHERE MOROCCAN KING ALLUDED TO REQUIBAT AND OTHER TRIBES AND REPORTEDLY MADE TERRITORIAL CLAIMS EXTENDING TO SENEGAL AND TOMBUCTU. NO RPT NO ADDITIONAL COMMENT.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

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Control: 1864
Rec'd: March 4, 1958
3:23 p.m.

1958
File
MESSAGE CENTER
AM 8 18

FROM: Rabat
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 920, March 4, 6 p.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 920, REPEATED INFORMATION PARIS 344, MADRID 120,
TUNIS, ALGIERS, CASABLANCA, TANGIER UNNUMBERED.

Following King's speech at Mohamid and Foreign Minister Balafrej's announcement after Royal Cabinet meeting at Zagora that government would give prior attention to re-establishment Moroccan frontiers, GOM now finds itself obliged to give territorial demands in Sahara precision hitherto conspicuously absent. GOM reserved its position on territories of Mauretania, Spanish Sahara and Ifni in fourth committee during last Assembly, but has until now specifically claimed sovereignty only in southern Spanish Morocco and Ifni. It probably would have preferred leave general Saharan question in limbo for some time longer, but can no longer bear internal pressures, Saharan fighting and current French plans for future organization and exploitation Sahara. Foreign Office now at work on preparing Morocco case, which is sure to lean heavily on history and desires local population.

French, who apparently taking Moroccan pretensions less seriously than Spanish, are trying to interest GOM in some kind joint Saharan exploitation. MOR Foreign Office has noted with satisfaction admission in recent Pineau speech that there are territories in dispute.

Spanish Embassy, on other hand, under instructions from Madrid has impression this Embassy gravity of recent Saharan developments and unreasonableness of Moroccan attitude. Spanish Embassy has in this general connection called our attention to increasing attacks in local Communist periodicals ESPOIR and HAYAT AS-SHAAB on US as well as French and Spanish position in Morocco.

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-2- 920, March 4, 6 p.m., from Rabat

Latest AOL communique published February 26 said AOL forces "withdrew without damage" from major engagements 11th and 19th in regions Regheoua and Raouda, where French allegedly participated with more than 25 planes as well as tanks and heavy artillery. AOL also charges French and Spanish with more than 600 casualties, among them children and old people, in attacks on El Aioun and Smara, and alleges that French and Spanish planes have spread poisonous (implied for vegetation, not humans) gas in grazing areas. Communique also announces AOL victories in Ifni on 15 and 19 of month.

Defense Minister yesterday issued communique denying Spanish allegation irregulars fighting in Ifni had bases at Bou Izakaran and Goulimine in Morocco. Minister said only combattants able to operate in Ifni were its inhabitants, Ait Ba Amrane, and that at two Moroccan towns cited only military bases were those of royal Moroccan Army. In fact, added communique, National Defense Committee meeting earlier in day in presence King and Crown Prince had decided reinforce those garrisons, as result of which Royal Armed Forces would be in position, given situation in that area, "to deal with any eventuality and fulfill their duty".

CANNON

AB:MLJ/1

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**OUTGOING
TELEGRAM****Department of State**INDICATE: COLLECT
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
1958 MAR 4 PM 48

DC/1
01273THIS DOCUMENT MUST BE RETURNED
TO THE RM/R CENTRAL FILESSENT TO: Amembassy PARIS 3209
RPTD INFO : Amembassy RABAT 888
" TUNIS (POUCH)
" MADRID (POUCH)

771.022

Origin
Info:
Suggest Embassy call Rabat's 904 to Murphy's attention.
Re. Spanish exercise great care to avoid military
action in Afri

771.022/3-458

Dist.
Desired
(Offices
Only)

Drafted by:

AFN:AFN:JA Bovey Jr:scct 3-4-58

Clearances:

WE - XXXXXXXXX MR. Jova

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

AFN - John A. Bovey, Jr.

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Classificationex-1
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MAR 4 1958 P.M.
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M-458

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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59-52

Action

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Control: 3372
Rec'd: March 6, 1958
1:37 p.m.

AF FROM: Rabat

Info RMR TO: Secretary of State

SS NO: 932, March 5, 9 p.m.

1958 MAR 7 PARIS AF
316 GOM MESSAGE CENTER

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C W L IO INR EUR P UOP WMSC IRC OCB USIA CIA OSD ARMY NAVY AIR
SENT DEPARTMENT 932; REPEATED INFORMATION MADRID 92, PARIS 347, LONDON 106, ALGIERS, TUNIS UNNUMBERED.
We were handed last night, as were other Rabat Embassies, note from Foreign Ministry drawing attention US Government to gravity of events in Ifni and warning of consequences if Spanish military action continued and spread beyond Ifni into Morocco. After reaffirming legal basis Moroccan claim to sovereignty and repeated efforts and continued desire to settle Ifni dispute through negotiations with Spain, note declared that "Spanish military aggression would put in danger security of Morocco and would lead fatally to state of war for which Spanish Government would alone shoulder heavy responsibility." Note, which is lengthy, being pouched.

GOM probably has mixed motives for such demarche at this time. It appears genuinely concerned by refugee influx and unrest in Morocco South. Moroccan sources claim to have evidence of Spanish preparations for major offensive Ifni, which, coming on heels apparent Franco-Spanish success in Sahara, would redouble GOM's predicament. Government has protested to Spanish Embassy allegations from Madrid that irregulars of Ifni had bases in Morocco and royal army units in Agadir province have been reinforced in line with Government's declared intent (EMBTEL 920). Regardless of who is to blame for renewed fighting on large scale, it would be difficult, as previous campaign illustrated, to confine its efforts to enclave.

GOM may also be preparing political move for which it is now trying to marshal foreign support by arousing fears for security in this part of world. This could either be prelude to presentation of Moroccan case against Spain to Security Council or attempt to bring outside pressure on Spain to negotiate

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MAR 8 1958

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-2- 932, March 5, 9 p.m. from Rabat

negotiate on terms acceptable to Morocco. Length and substance of note are evidence in any case that GOM feels compelled to agitate Ifni question, either for reasons of prestige or because of actual dangers, or both.

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RSP:GEV/8

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42

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Action

Control: 3568

AF

Rec'd: March 6, 1958
5:45 p.m.

Info

FROM: Rabat

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 938, March 6, 7 p.m.

G

SP

SENT DEPARTMENT 938, REPEATED INFORMATION MADRID 94, PARIS 351,
TUNIS 124, CASABLANCA, TANGIER UNNUMBERED.

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Reference: EMBTEL 848

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WMSC

Balafrej tells me that notwithstanding general worsening of relations with Spain and Morocco bitterness because of joint Spanish-French military campaign in south he is still ready to act along lines we suggested. He had in fact already done so. Day before yesterday he called in Spanish Ambassador and talked earnestly with him about urgent need of settlement by negotiation which will become increasingly difficult if present hostilities not suspended. He says he was disappointed in Spanish response which was almost offensively arrogant. All he could get out of Ambassador was remark that he would report conversation to Madrid. He says Spanish not only maintain first and third preconditions (effective control of southern zone by Royal Moroccan Army and administrative apparatus, and commitment regarding all other boundaries) but they have revived second precondition which he thought they were by way of giving up, namely, preferential rights of economic exploitation. He thinks first precondition could be almost automatically disposed of by assurances already given to Spanish but if they still question his word public statement along lines we suggested could be made. He finds no justification for second which seems particularly unreasonable since region is barren and poor, yet Spain is asking Moroccans for servitude on resources as yet undiscovered. As for third precondition he used much same language as our observation in paragraph 8 EMBTEL 876: He finds it presumptuous of Spain to demand a formal renunciation in advance in areas where neither Spain nor France is yet willing to negotiate in 1958 where frontiers have never been more than vaguely delimited. He personally envisages a joint participation in areas to be defined by negotiation in which he could assure me Moroccan pretensions

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771-022/3-658

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-2- 938, March 6, 7 p.m., from Rabat

pretentions would be reasonable enough. See in this connection EMBTEL 889.

General situation in south is causing GOM great concern. Refugees from "various regions" continue to drift to Gpulimene where they must be sheltered, fed and clothed. In their idleness and distress they are causing serious social and political problem.

As regards joint French-Spanish military campaign he said that since this has been set out as terminated by "complete victory" he would now ask French Ambassador to come in and would press him to open negotiation on military question.

I took opportunity this conversation again to point out bluntly a major weakness in Moroccan position, namely equivocal character of AOL or other irregulars. I said that people everywhere are taking it for granted they have aid and encouragement of GOM extent of which varies according to degree of animosity of appraiser. I urged that if negotiations can be undertaken GOM concurrently demonstrate its authority within country and exert restraining influence in adjacent areas.

We understand Spanish Ambassador has returned to Madrid for consultation with Cortina, new aide to Foreign Minister with special responsibility for Moroccan affairs. This would seem useful moment to convey to GOS our understanding of Moroccan position as described above and in preceding telegrams and our hope negotiations on Ifni and southern zone can be resumed. We could legitimately express very live concern in dangers all around in resumption Ifni hostilities, and this Embassy would also think it very much to point to warn GOS of serious embarrassment for US in any Spanish use of US military equipment.

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AB:INK/5

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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : AMCONGEN, DAKAR, F.W.A.

181
DESP. NO.

771.022/3-658

XK 751 E. 00

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

March 6, 1958

DATE

REF : ConGen's telegram No. 90, rptd Rabat UNN, Paris 23 AF s/s f skc par

IV For Dept. Use Only	ACTION AF-5	DEPT. N F OTHER	Rm/R. 2 ITC-8 EUR-5 P-5 IO-4 Ulo-1 Ulo/p. CIA-12 050-4 Army-4 Navy-3 Air. 3 OCB-1
	REC'D 3/11	O	

SUBJECT: Official announcement at Dakar regarding now ended Mauritanian military operations

Kabat-1, Madra-1 US, A-4
Paris-1 Abijan-1

The French military authorities at Dakar have duplicated the Spanish Government's gesture, and in the March 3, 1958, number of Paris-Dakar issued the following official explanation of the recent Mauritanian-Rio de Oro military operations which started in early February 1958:

"OPERATIONS IN MAURITANIA ENSURE THE SECURITY OF THE BORDERS

"Following repeated incidents in Mauritania, and, more particularly, the aggression of January 25, at a distance of about 50 kilometers northwest of Fort Trinquet, and the February 8 ambush at Motlami Well, it is announced in authorized circles that at the request of the Territorial Government of Mauritania, the authorities responsible for maintenance of order in AOF undertook police operations aimed at ensuring security along the Northern border so as to prevent any new attack.

"These operations came to a satisfactory end this week and at the same time, a real relief has been noted among the populations of the border region who, for several months were subjected to repeated exactions from undesirable elements foreign to the Territory of Mauritania.

"The results obtained to date permit the conclusion that the bands which have been located, hunt down, dispersed, and disorganized, have suffered severe losses, and that for this very reason, they will find it impossible to continue aggressive operations or intimidations of Mauritanian populations.

"It is interesting to note in this connection that the Reguibat tribes, led momentarily by subversive elements, have now asked for our protection, a fact which constitutes an historical event, for important elements of these nomadic populations had never agreed up until now to cooperate with the authorities.

"Our losses during the operations reached the figures of 5 killed and 30 wounded.

"It is generally thought in AOF that the action undertaken permitted the liquidation of the disturbing elements in these regions, which Mr. Belafrej, the Moroccan Minister of Foreign Affairs, disowned when he visited Dakar in calling

DDumont/lbb

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"them 'uncontrolled bands'.


"On the political side, Mr. Moktar Ould Daddah, Vice President of the Conseil du Gouvernement of Mauritania, has several times solemnly declared that the populations of the Territory had no intention to become involved in foreign intrigues and that they would defend their sovereignty by all means available.

"AN OFFICIAL STATEMENT FROM THE SPANISH WAR DEPARTMENT

"The Spanish War Department published on last Saturday a communique concerning the operations that took place since the beginning of the month in the Spanish Sahara, in collaboration with French Forces.

"During the fighting, the communique declares, 214 rebels were killed and Spanish losses were 8 killed and 34 wounded."

French Surgeon General GOURVIL informed me on March 5 that the above cited figures of French losses (5 dead, 30 wounded) were correct.


Donald Dumont
American Consul General

Dept. Please rpt Paris, Abidjan, Rabat, Madrid

MD

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771.022/3-658

XR 652.71

FROM : AmEmbassy RABAT

269
DESP. NO.

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

March 6, 1958

REF : Embassy ^{AF} telegram 932

MAR - 7 1958 L-2

<i>SO</i> For Dept.	ACTION	DEPT.
Use Only	AF-5	I RM/R-2 IRC-8 EAR-5 P-5 IO-4 910P-1 910-1
REC'D	3-19	N F OTHER O CIA-12 OSD-4 2151A-10 ARMY-4 NAVY-3 AIR-3

SUBJECT: Moroccan Note on Ifni.

OCB-1
771.022/3-658

HBS

Enclosed is a copy of the note on Ifni handed this Embassy by the Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs on March 4, 1958. Similar notes were sent to the other Embassies in Rabat, including those of France and Great Britain, but with the natural exception of the Spanish Embassy, whose Ambassador had already been warned of the serious consequences that would result from a resumption of hostilities in Ifni.

The apparent explanation for this demarche by Morocco to the foreign governments represented in Rabat is its fear that Spain is about to launch a large-scale offensive in Ifni and that, in view of Spanish accusations that insurgent bases are located at Goulimine and Bou Izakarn in Morocco (which the Moroccan Government denies), the danger is great that hostilities would spread to Morocco.

"Spanish military aggression," the note warns, "would inexorably lead to a state of war for which the Spanish government would alone bear the heavy responsibility."

There seems little doubt that the Moroccan Government is genuinely concerned over signs of an imminent Spanish offensive and by the unrest among refugees and partisans in the southern Moroccan province of Agadir in which the enclave of Ifni is imbedded. It undoubtedly seeks a better understanding of the Moroccan position in foreign capitals in the event Royal Moroccan Army units are forced into action or Morocco feels constrained to refer the Ifni and Sahara problems to the Security Council as a threat to international peace.

But the note can also be presumed to have been written in the hope that the intervention of friendly powers would induce Spain to abandon any plans for reconquest of Ifni and to resume direct negotiations with Morocco on its future status. What the Moroccan Government wishes to drive home is that the international texts support its claim to sovereignty over Ifni, that it is willing to recognize special Spanish interests there but not Spanish sovereignty, that the inhabitants of Ifni want reunification with Morocco, that Morocco has with great forbearance and patience sought to negotiate a peaceful settlement with Spain and that the uprising of last November was spontaneous and due entirely to Spanish provocation.

Enclosure

Embassy's translation of French text.
cc: Paris, Madrid.

JFR
JFRoot/vn

REPORTER

FOR THE AMBASSADOR:


 Don V. Catlett
 First Secretary of Embassy

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771.022/3-658

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Page 1 of
Encl. No. 1
Desp. No. 269
From Rabat

Embassy's Translation of French Text

Kingdom of Morocco
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
No. 9592/CAB

NOTE

"The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its compliments to the Embassy of the United States of America and has the honor to draw its attention to the grave events presently taking place in Ifni and to the serious consequences which may flow from them.

On the morrow of the proclamation of the independence of Morocco, the inhabitants of the Ifni enclave peacefully manifested their desire to enjoy, like their compatriots, their independence and their freedom. Accredited Ait-Baamrane delegations came to His Majesty the King to whom they expressed their wish to see this part of Moroccan territory no longer subjected to the special statute which the Spanish authorities claimed the right to impose. The demarches and manifestations which the Ait-Baamrane have repeatedly undertaken to this end have always had a peaceful character. To their desire not to disturb the atmosphere of amity was added the conviction that the Spanish government, the understanding attitude of which with regard to Morocco had been particularly evident, could not go counter to their just and legitimate demands. The reaction of the Spanish authorities of the enclave unfortunately failed to meet these ~~ex~~-pectations. The local population was subjected to pitiless repression in August 1957 resulting in numerous victims. Deportations and imprisonment were the answer to the nationalist and labor union movements. This repressive activity was even highlighted by flagrant violations of Moroccan territory. These activities were intensified during the month of November 1957 at the time at which the Ait-Baamrane celebrated the Feast of the Throne and of Independence.

This blind repression had to lead perforce to the exasperation of the population which soon unanimously rebelled against Spanish authority. The rising of the Ait-Baamrane involved developments of extreme gravity which rendered Hispano-Moroccan relationships most delicate.

His Majesty the King, despite the feeling which ran high throughout Moroccan territory due to the measures of repression at Ifni, repeatedly put forward conciliatory proposals. The Moroccan government, desiring to entertain freely ? relations with Spain, had always proposed that the solution of the problem of Ifni be negotiated peacefully. The repeated refusal of Spain (to do so) is particularly regrettable since a brief look at the history of the enclave can only show any interested observer that Morocco's claims are legitimate. The Hispano-Moroccan treaty of 1860 on which Spanish pretensions are founded specifies in Article 8 that the object of the Moroccan concession is a fishing establishment. ("His Moroccan Majesty agrees to concede in perpetuity to his Catholic Majesty, on the coast of the ocean near Santa Cruz la Petite sufficient territory for the formation of a fishery establishment similar to the one which Spain possessed there in the past.") The present borders of the enclave could hardly be cited against Moroccan claims, as they were agreed in that country's

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absence between France and Spain (Article 4 of the secret Franco-Spanish convention dated October 3, 1904.)

At no time did Morocco divest itself of its sovereignty over this integral part of its territory. The texts bearing upon Ifni having never cited a cession of territory to Spain, the exercise of Spanish sovereignty cannot be justified. In officially informing Spain of its position, Morocco, animated by the desire to guarantee legitimate Spanish interests, stated its intention not to put in question the fishing concession which Spain presently enjoys.

The information lately obtained from the enclave indicates that the Spanish authorities have resumed their military campaign with great intensity. The Air-Baamrane are subjected to continuous bombardment; a veritable war of extermination has devastated the region. Important reinforcements land from the sea while men and munitions are parachuted from the sky. Ever more numerous columns of Ait-Baamrane refugees move daily towards Goulimine and the other localities on the periphery of the enclave.

The importance of the means used, the coordination of the action undertaken at Ifni with similar military maneuvers observed in the extreme South of Morocco, gravely preoccupy His Majesty and His government. If Spanish military action were to extend beyond the Ifni zone as, unfortunately, the information reaching Rabat leads us to fear, the government of His Majesty draws, as of now, the attention of the Embassy of the United States of America to the serious consequences which may result.

Spanish military aggression would endanger the security of Morocco and would inexorably lead to a state of war for which the Spanish government would alone bear the heavy responsibility.

The government of His Majesty, which nevertheless still hopes to see the Spanish government return to conceptions more in keeping with its friendship with Morocco as well as with the manifest interests of this important part of the world, would be grateful to the Embassy of the United States of America if it were to bring the contents of this Note to the attention of its government and takes this occasion to renew to it the assurances of its highest consideration."

Rabat, March 4, 1958.

/Translated by PSebastian/

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File Designation 771.022/3-658
TEL 935
Date MAR 6, 1958
From RABOT
To SECSTATR

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- Security-Classified Information
 Otherwise Restricted Information

STATR

Authority

11/2/85

Date

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(27)

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Amembassy Madrid
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Amembassy London 6326

Amconsul Algiers (poush)

Paris Pass Murphy NC

EMC

Rabat 935 French Embassy here informed Dept. March 7 FONOFF Had instructed

French Embassy Madrid tell GOS that GOF hoped Spanish would exercise great caution in order avoid military action involving Moroccan territory near Ifni.

Embassy also told us French forces Morocco would be reduced over coming months.

Embassy asked us protect source above

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771-022/3-658

RM/R	Anal 40
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Drafted by AFB :: JBovey

March 8, 1958

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

Joseph Palmer 2nd

Clearances:

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DCT:MG

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1. See sections 145.42 and 145.43 of the Manual of Regulations and Procedures for addressing procedure.
2. Note that these sections explain how to use "By Pouch" indicator for posts not requiring information urgently by telegram.
3. Remember that most consular posts normally handle an extremely small volume of telegraph traffic and are not equipped to receive long telegrams or telegrams of dubious urgency.
4. In using all-inclusive addresses like "All Diplomatic Missions" there rarely should be an instance where telegraphic transmission to all posts can be justified; therefore, make sure maximum use has been made of "By Pouch" indicator.
5. Prepare two circulars rather than one when: (1) many posts require the information urgently but only a few need a full explanation; (2) the major part of a message is unclassified and only the Departmental comment or instruction need be classified.
6. When press releases have to be sent to posts telegraphically, first determine whether the release is being broadcast by the USIA Bulletin, thus making the telegram unnecessary for many posts. When a circular telegram is classified because it contains a press release sent out in advance of the release date, send the full text to only the posts needing full text; to other posts, send a brief digest so as to reduce post decipherment work.
7. For information on pouch transit times, consult your pouch schedule or call extension 4233 in DC/P for specific details. For technical assistance involving circular or multiple-address telegrams, call DC/T, extension 4324. If assistance was obtained from DC on this message, show below name of person consulted.

(Write in name of person in DC/P)

(Write in name of person in DC/T)

CERTIFICATION

Following certification to be completed and signed by person whose name appears in authorizing block of telegram form:

Telegram Identification: Date drafted 3-8-58 Drafting Office Symbol AFN

The attached telegram has been prepared with full consideration of the above seven guidance points. The urgency of the subject matter makes it essential to send the message telegraphically to all posts shown. Pouch services will not provide sufficiently fast service except to those posts where the "By Pouch" indicator has been used.


John A. Bovey, Jr., ^{Deputy} Director, AFN
(Typed name and organization symbol of authorizing officer)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

(90)

MAR 11 1958

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RM/R

SUBJECT: 18 2. French Urge Spanish Caution in Ifni Area

DATE: March 7, 1958

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771.022/3-758

CS/K

CONFIDENTIAL FILE

771.022/3-758

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NEA(cc)
AFN(3cc)
WE (cc)
INR (2cc)

⑥ Amembassy, PARIS ✓
Amembassy, RABAT ✓
Amembassy, MADRID ✓

1-1493

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Mr. Leprette said that the French Embassy in Madrid had been instructed to urge the Spanish Government to exercise caution in the Ifni area so as to avoid any Spanish military action on Moroccan territory. Mr. Leprette added that the French would be in a very difficult position should the Spanish act against Moroccan territory in view of French obligation to assist Morocco if she were attacked.

FILED

Mar 11 1958

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AF:AFN:WJPorter:prc

39

Re: 18

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

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SECRET

53

Action EUR

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Control:
Rec'd:

5756
DEPT OF STATE
March 10, 1958
6:55 p.m.

1958 MAR 10
AM 7 20
H/13

OFFICE OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
TELEGRAMS
FBI

FROM: Madrid

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 953, March 10, 9 p.m.

NIACT

SENT DEPARTMENT 953; REPEATED INFORMATION RABAT 79, PARIS 162,
LONDON 70.

Foreign Minister called me personally on phone this afternoon to request me urgently come to his office. He made following statements; AOL troops which were in Spanish Sahara for purpose attacking French outposts of Mauretania and Spanish outposts had been dispersed and effectively destroyed thanks Franco-Spanish military operations. Accordingly it has been demonstrated AOL alone cannot succeed against France or Spain and certainly not against both together. He estimated 5,000 Spanish troops in Ifni area and 10,000 Spanish Sahara. He pointed out French-Spanish forces dispose of some 150 planes and that AOL was no match for superior equipment of French-Spanish forces. Once AOL was defeated COM took opportunity do something it couldn't do before, i.e., send troops in area around Ifni where there had been AOL troops. COM said to Ben Hamuan of AOL: (1) you couldn't succeed against Ifni and you cannot throw Spaniards into sea; (2) you were beaten in Sahara and you can see that you cannot prevail against French-Spanish forces; (3) now you run risk of being victims of a combined French-Spanish offensive from Ifni, Tindouf and Sahara which will annihilate you in the southern zone. Foreign Minister asserts on his word of honor that this offensive is a complete invention by GOM and surmised that GOM said this to scare AOL and enable RMA eventually substitute for them. AOL had as objective larger Morocco. King then made speech at Zagora. In effect he said to AOL we have same ambitions as you. GOM ordered RMA (about 20,000 troops) go south from Agadir to Goulimine and frontier of Ifni north of river Draa. GOM did not want French or Spanish officers of RMA involved and so these troops are led by Moroccan officers.

Foreign Minister

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SECRET

-2- 953, March 10, 9 p.m. from Madrid

Foreign Minister said he had just finished talking on telephone to Arielza Washington. He told him that French Ambassador Madrid had informed him this morning GOM had advised French in Rabat and in Paris that RMA will occupy Southern Morocco which Moroccans say Spaniards do not want cede. Foreign Minister emphasizes that Spaniards do want cede Southern Morocco but desire (1) that take over should be by RMA and not AOL. With elimination AOL by French-Spanish forces this objective now much more probably.

(2) Treaty 1912 contemplated Northern and Southern Moroccan zones. Treaty of declaration Moroccan independence signed by former Foreign Minister Artajo spring 1956 includes Spanish agreement to respect Moroccan integrity. Foreign Minister states this however means at 27.40 parallel. He says Moroccans must agree that Morocco ends at this southern line. The eastern frontier of Morocco to be determined between Moroccans and French.

GOS according Foreign Minister wants us know Moroccans have intention occupy southern zone without prior negotiation with GOS. State Department should know, he said, that GOS declines all responsibility for what may happen if Moroccans decide confront Spain with fait accompli in Southern Morocco as AOL attempted to do in Ifni. Spaniards want negotiate in order agree on southern limit of Moroccan territory.

I asked Foreign Minister what GOS would do if French Ambassador report proved accurate. Foreign Minister replied that such action might result in war between Spain and Morocco. He hopes that in our own interest we will advise GOM not to move RMA into southern Morocco without prior negotiation with GOS. Says GOS ready as in case Ifni to submit question of southern boundary Morocco to international arbitration.

Foreign Minister pointed out that King has already asked for retirement all foreign forces Morocco. If Spanish and French forces leave, then US forces will be asked get out says Foreign Minister. He wants US stay in Morocco even though US bases in Spain would increase in value if US-Morocco bases abandoned. Foreign Minister states once French, Spanish and US forces have departed from Morocco, then North African countries will resort to the most "fantastic kind of blackmail" and Russian aid will come in perhaps even Russian bases.

Foreign Minister

SECRET

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

-3- 953, March 10, 9 p.m. from Madrid

Foreign Minister was calm and unruffled but clearly earnest in his desire to impress us with seriousness situation.

LODGE

AB:JVC/9

NOTE: Mr. Thompson (WE) notified at 9:10 pm, 3/10/58 - EH.

SECRET FILE

~~SECRET~~

**OUTGOING
TELEGRAM**INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO**Department of State****SECRET****Classification**

1958 MAR 11 PM 7 09

050611

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SENT TO: Amembassy, MADRID - ~~REVIEW~~ NIAC 1131
RPTD INFO: Amembassy, RABAT 921
Amembassy, PARIS 3316
Amembassy, LONDON 6409

Origin

Info:

Embtel 953, Deptel 1127.

1771.022/3-1056
In light Castiella's remarks Madrid telegram 953 re possibility war withMorocco if presented fait accompli in Southern Zone, we believe following
thought, which fits logically/numbered paragraphs 2 and 3 of Deptel 1127,
should also be conveyed Castiella.In our opinion ~~it would be a mistake~~ for Spain resist by force
anticipated effort GOM exercise its sovereignty in Southern Zone through
in RMA as heretofore requested by Spain, / In view previous Spanish recognition
leave Spain
Moroccan sovereignty this area, ~~Spain~~ would ~~not~~ without legal justification
in UN or elsewhere
for such action/and would seriously damage her position in world public

771.022/3-1058

RM/R opinion. As noted Rabat instructions Deptel 1127 we attempting suggest
Anal 2. Moroccans refrain actions prejudicial peaceful solutions and settle by
Rev. negotiation. However, we suggest that Spain consider whether report
Cat. Moroccan intention fait accompli takeover by RMA does not present oppor-
tunity which should be seized to eliminate one major source of friction,

strengthen

SEL

Drafted by EUR: W. H. Thompson: paw 3/11/58

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

EUR - C. Burke Elbrick

Clearances:

AFN - Mr. Bovey (in draft)

WPA

L/EUR - MEXICO CITY Mr. Kearney

RWT

S/SEC

SECRET**Classification**

MAR 11 1958 P.M.

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SECRET*Classification*

strengthen Spanish legal position for the future with regard to Sahara in which she truly interested and assume a statesmanlike posture in Moroccan and world opinion. We suggest this might be done by formal notification to GOM followed by public announcement that since GOM now prepared exercise its sovereignty Southern Zone through RMA as long requested by Spanish Government, Spanish forces now withdrawing beyond Moroccan frontier of 27.40 parallel claimed by Spanish under treaty. This unilateral action by Spain could give Spain legally defensible position for future. Believe you should point out for Spanish consideration that boundary agreement insisted upon by Spain, if it could be obtained, might not repeat not reinforce Spanish position in view possibility GOM might denounce subsequently and receive strong support on grounds agreement made under duress by virtue Spanish refusal withdraw troops from territory admittedly Moroccan unless agreement to boundary given. At all events we convinced Spain can only lose in long run by armed resistance within Southern Zone and hope they will be able avoid such development.

Leiter
ACTING*(QSS)**URGENT***SECRET***Classification*

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

Department of State

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification

1958 MAR 10 PM 7-39
04517
DCI

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SENT TO: Amembassy, MADRID -Priority 1127
Amembassy, RABAT - Priority 91/NIACT 687
RPTD INFO: Amembassy, PARIS, LONDON, TUNIS, ALGIERS (POUCH), DAKAR (POUCH). 3292 6375

Origin

Info:

Spanish Ambassador requested urgent appointment Elbrick March 10 to transmit message from Castiella to effect Spanish intelligence confirmed by French intelligence reports GOM planning infiltrate army units across Dra into southern zone in order face Spanish with fait accompli. Preparatory steps have included incorporating AOL units into RMA by device issuance arm bands and removal French officers from RMA units southern Morocco. While both these steps admittedly within discretion GOM Castiella wished make point any military infiltration in advance negotiated arrangements could not repeat nor but invite armed resistance Spanish garrisons which now limited to coastal area. This would be completely unnecessary since GOS remains ready hand over territorial control by negotiation only insisting that results

Distr.
Desired
(OMS
Only)

RM/R be formalized by simple written protocol. Under questioning Areilza appeared Anal. 21 certain Moroccans had so far made no effort open such negotiations (this Rev. appears inconsistent with Rabat's 938). After extended discussion present Cat. Spanish requirements it appeared (if Areilza is fully informed) that Spaniards agree possibility RMA control encouraging and that economic preference

Drafted by: HG Torbert; EUR:WE:JJ Jova:jg 3-10-58

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: *[Signature]* Maxximilian EUR - Mr. Jandrey

Clearances:

AF - Mr. Porter

S/S-CR

MAR 10 1958 P.M.

[Signature] checker S/S

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771023-1058

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~~Classification~~

conditions are not repeat not serious problem. However GOS will insist that GOM agree to specific limits of territory they are taking over. They believe this necessary because present boundary established under protectorate and Moroccans can always disclaim acceptance. Areilza observed agreement on boundary does not repeat not require renouncing forever claims to additional territory.

Areilza said all GOS wished prior to withdrawing from southern zone was conference which could be brief and signed protocol which could be simple. They would be glad to have US Government participate such discussions. Earnestly hoped however GOM could be dissuaded from taking further rash military adventures.

Elbrick replied US certainly did not repeat not desire participate negotiations nor to get involved in anything resembling mediation. Without assuming responsibility however we would of course look into matter and ascertain whether we could by informal representations pave way for pacific settlement.

For Rabat: ^{soonest (Madrid 953 Rptd Rabat 79)}
1. Embassy should approach Balafrej stating Spaniards have expressed

concern over reports of possible attempt military fait accompli in Southern Zone, and express US hope GOM WILL REFRAIN from any action which would prejudice peaceful solution.
At same time you may state we have repeated assurances from Castiella Spaniards have no intention attack Morocco. Spanish Foreign Ministry has made similar declaration to press. We believe atmosphere would be cleared should GOM give public assurances it has no aggressive intentions. At same time GOM could remove any doubts its position by public offer discuss outstanding problems and by actual commencement discussion modalities Spanish withdrawal Southern zone. ~~with which Spaniards would proceed such discussions.~~
~~they prepared protocol~~ We also have reason believe Spaniards susceptible reasonable negotiated compromise re Ifni.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


~~Classification~~

Page 3 of telegram to MADRID, RABAT

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Classification

2. We see only greatest dangers for all concerned any resumption hostilities and hope that Morocco may assist in creating atmosphere conducive restoring its relationship with Spain on basis mutual understanding and bilateral discussions. Balafrej should understand that Spain also has public opinion problem in that Spanish consider liberation army was aggressor and until improvement in atmosphere takes place it is difficult return to path of negotiations. In this connection, recent Moroccan statements had been interpreted Madrid as setting forth Moroccan aspirations of such magnitude as not to be conducive to fruitful negotiations.



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~~Classification~~

[For Madrid: You should speak to Castiella as follows:

1. Our Ambassador in Morocco last week followed up Secretary's [advice] to Balafrej re need controlling irregular forces and again pointed out to GOM equivocal character of AOL and other irregulars; he emphasized that people everywhere take it for granted that irregulars have aid and encouragement GOM. Ambassador again urged that negotiations be undertaken and that GOM currently demonstrate its authority within country and exert restraining influence in adjacent area. In reply Balafrej again indicated to us that notwithstanding general worsening of Moroccan relations with Spain he is still ready to act along lines our previous suggestions.

2. As a consequence of Ambassador Areilza's demarche we are now instructing Ambassador Cannon to tell Balafrej that in view Spanish assurances that Spain has no intention attacking Morocco, we believe atmosphere would be cleared by:

A. GOM public assurances it has no aggressive intentions;
B. GOM public offer discuss outstanding problems and by actual discussion with Spain modalities Spanish withdrawal Southern Zone.

3. While we consider Spanish desire written acknowledgment precise border Southern Zone to be taken over by Moroccan Government reasonable, it would appear insistence on formula involving complete renunciation any further Moroccan claims could unreasonably obstruct settlement. Recommend in any discussions Foreign Office Embassy stress importance flexibility this formula and attempt clear up discrepancy between Areilza statements re willingness negotiate and Balafrej assertion first para Rabat's 94 to Madrid.

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~~Classification~~

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4. We see only greatest dangers for all concerned in any resumption hostilities, particularly in Ifni, and hope negotiations both sides can avoid this. We recall previous Spanish offer arbitrate Ifni and believe public reiteration willingness arbitrate or negotiate would have useful effect. FYI. Areilza during conversation stressed at length Spanish willingness negotiate reasonable settlement Ifni which would protect Spanish requirements and dignity but satisfy Moroccan sovereignty aspirations. End FYI.

*Letter Acting
(38)*

CONFIDENTIAL

Classification

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

54-L

CONFIDENTIAL

Action

Control: 6545

EUR

FROM: Rabat

Rec'd: March 11, 1958
4:32 p.m.

Info

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 961, March 11, 8 p.m.

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NIACT

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SENT DEPARTMENT 961, MADRID PRIORITY 97, REPEATED INFORMATION
PARIS 362, LONDON 113, TUNIS 130, DAKAR 5, ALGIERS 89.

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Reference: DEPTEL 911

Saw Balaerej this afternoon. He confirmed events have reached point extreme tension within GOM. Told me in confidence he has already twice interceded with King to restrain personalities who scoff at his repeated failures to regain southern area former Spanish protectorate by friendly negotiation. Says his record does indeed look bad. He has written several notes to not one of which has he had courtesy of reply. Last note just week ago. Moroccan Ambassador has three times called at Foreign Office Madrid to urge settlement and "all they say is question very complicated".

I urged him at all costs to delay any unilateral action and make one more effort to engage Spanish in some sort of agreement however incomplete or provisional which could be taken as basis for more sober negotiation on both sides. As reported EMBTEL 938 he sees no difficulty on assurances re efficient and orderly military and administrative control by organs of GOM. On Spanish third condition precedent he says territory now in question is only that already admitted as Moroccan territory by formal termination of protectorate southern boundary being line 27 degrees 40. Anything else should be matter of subsequent and entirely separate negotiation when general question of delimitation of frontiers (see end first paragraph EMBTEL 938) can be taken up all around. As regards second precondition (economic exploitation) he is still disappointed that Spanish maintain their demand. I said I understood

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-2- 961, March 11, 8 p.m., from Rabat

understood there might be some flexibility on this point.

He gave me bad quarter of hour on my observations re Spanish public relations problem. Surely we have seen inflammatory and outrageous recent press campaign of Arriba and A. B. C. for example which under Spanish system must be either inspired or at least tolerated by GOS. Let latter give some guidance to their press if they have any serious intention to negotiate.

As for public declarations he demurred at this juncture, referring me to his earlier well-meant but ineffectual statements; moreover "it would not (repeat not) help in improving atmosphere because Spanish do not (repeat not) like it". I argued on this and he agreed to think it over.

He said he would go at once to King reporting our conversation and later in evening when Defense Council meets would seek instructions to summon Spanish Ambassador tomorrow and try again to bring about an orderly and "genuinely amicable" settlement of this long overdue transfer. On this last point I think he spoke with deep conviction, for he went on to deplore general situation hereabouts for which arbitrary action and force have proved wrong method.

CANNON

AAL:INK/5

NOTE: Read by Mr. Service (WE) at 7 pm, 3/11/58 - JRL/CWO.

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TO THE RM/R CENTRAL FILES
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FROM: RABAT
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 958, MARCH 11

SENT DEPARTMENT 958, REPEATED INFORMATION PARIS 360 MADRID 96.

IN HIS MOROCCAN SAHARA OF MARCH 8 ALLAL EL-FASSI SAYS MOROCCAN FOREIGN MINISTRY POSSESSES DEFINITE INFORMATION THAT FRENCH PLANES PARTICIPATED IN BOMBING OF AIT BA'AMRANE COMBATANTS THEN LANDED "MOROCCAN TERRITORY" FOR REST AND REFUELING. FURTHERMORE, SAYS FASSI, COMMUNIQUE SPANISH DEFENSE MINISTRY CLEARLY CONFIRMS FRENCH-SPANISH MILITARY COLLABORATION AGAINST MOROCCO.

COLONIALISTS SAY THEY ARE COLLABORATING ON TERRITORY NOT MOROCCAN BUT, ASKS FASSI, ARE NOT INHABITANTS "THAT PART OF MOROCCO MOROCCAN MOSLEMS ABOVE ALL?"

DID NOT FORMER PROTECTING POWERS RECOGNIZE INDEPENDENCE AND UNITY MOROCCO WITHIN NATURAL AND HISTORIC FRONTIERS? IT IS INADMISSIBLE THAT LIBERATED MOROCCO SHOULD SERVE AGAINST MOROCCO STILL UNDER FOREIGN DOMINATION.

FASSI SEES PRESENCE FRENCH AND SPANISH ARMIES MOROCCO JUSTIFIED ONLY IF HERE TO HELP MOROCCO-- EITHER PROVISIONALLY UNDER ACCORDS LIQUIDATING PROTECTORATES OR AS ALLIES. AT VERY LEAST THEIR NEUTRALITY DEMANDED. EVENTS THUS PROVE THAT FRONTIER AND ALGERIAN PROBLEMS ARE INTIMATELY LINKED WITH PROBLEM FOREIGN FORCES AND THEIR PRESENCE IN MOROCCO.

CANNON

MLJ/20

771-022/3-1158

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Control: 7132

MAR 13 1958

Rec'd: March 12, 1958

10:41 a.m.

FROM: Paris

JJ

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 4186, March 12, 2 p.m.

MAR 13 AM 7:22

OFFICE
OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
MESSAGE CENTER

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SENT DEPARTMENT 4186 REPEATED INFORMATION RABAT 247, MADRID 328.

DEPTEL 911 to Rabat, 1127 to Madrid information Paris 3292.

In view GOF concern over development Moroccan-Spanish relations (as evidence DEPTEL 3282), believe it would be helpful inform foreign office in confidence of substance Spanish demarche to US and Department's instructions Rabat and Madrid. Accordingly request discretionary authority to do so.

HOUGHTON

TT: OGM/2

771 • 022/3 - 1258

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APR 8 - 1958

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44-48

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Action

Control:
Rec'd:

8271
March 13, 1958
6:19 p.m.^{pm}

AF
Info

FROM: Rabat

716
1914
MESSAGE CENTER
AF

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 973, March 13, 5 p.m.

G

SP

SENT DEPARTMENT 973, REPEATED INFORMATION PARIS 364. - *Not 1*

C

L

In press conference on March 11 Minister of Interior M. Hammedi propounding Moroccan claims to Saharz concluded by suggesting that frontier commission meet to clarify Moroccan boundaries. This bid reinforcing Balafrej's March 6 press statement calling for meeting Franco-Moroccan frontier commission promises to raise commission to status as primary factor in Franco-Moroccan relations. Department will recall that in spite of Balafrej's reproof of French unresponsiveness on this score it has been French until recently who have sought to get frontier commission in action.

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AIR

Status of problem is that French last summer proposed its own membership and terms of reference of commission to GOM but latter has not until last few days taken action on French proposals. During November session of Consultative Assembly EL ALAM reported that Balafrej stated French refused accept GOM proposal convoke frontier commission which account was later denied by Foreign Office as inaccurate reporting.

French Embassy says that it was only after Balafrej's press conference that GOM actually approached French with proposal that frontier commission meet. In doing so GOM did not respond to suggested French terms of reference. French were instructed to reply in such a way as to delay meeting of commission and suggest theme that more important question was collaboration in exploitation Sahara resources about which proposals would shortly be forthcoming. Although idea is to take heat out of boundary issues, French Embassy believes this tactic is useless because political importance boundaries and irredentism in

Moroccan

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-2- 973, March 13, 5 p.m., from Rabat

doubtful? **Moroccan mind far outweighs intangible future benefits which might arise from developing cadre of Franco-Magreb in cooperation in Sahara.**

AP Foreign Office official in discussing frontiers problem explained that reticence which GOM had had concerning negotiations with French on boundaries, i.e., principally that of coming to delimitation of Algerian border with French rather than with subsequent "Algerian authorities", had been exceeded* by press of political evolution in which peoples of Morocco Sahara seeking incorporation with Morocco. He stated that GOM had "very recently" requested meeting of Franco-Moroccan boundary commission and confirmed French reply consistent with above. He commented that GOM does not (repeat not) consider this satisfactory answer because boundary question is independent, while at same time collateral, question to exploitation Sahara. Although GOM awaits concrete French proposals re exploitation Sahara there is no reason why boundary commission cannot proceed with its work. (EMB COMMUN?)

CANNON

RSP:INK/5

* As received, will be serviced upon request.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

Department of State

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Classification

1958 MAR 13 PM 5 37

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SENT TO: Amembassy, PARIS

3353

RPTD INFO: Amembassy, MADRID
Amembassy, RABAT

1144

932

771.022

REFERENCE: Paris tel 4186, DEPTEL 3316 and previous.

Embassy authorized [redacted] convey on confidential basis substance of developments Moroccan-Spanish relations and our efforts relieve tensions. We would be interested in views [redacted] Foreign Office and particularly whether it has made representations indicated Rabat 349 to Paris.

Herter

A C T I N G

(RMS) HERTER

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(Offices
Only)

RM/R	[initials]
Anal	[initials]
Rev	
Cal	

Drafted by:
EUR:WE:JJJova:jg

3-13-58

Telegraphic transmission and
decryption approved by:

Richard M. Service

Clearances:

AFN - Mr. Bovey

S/S-CR

MAR 13 1958 P.M.

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RPTD INFO: Amembassy, RABAT 933
Amembassy, PARIS 3354
Amembassy, LONDON 6488

Deptels 1127 and 1131. — 771.022/3-1058

Elbrick called in Areilza yesterday and spoke along lines reftels asked you speak Castiella. Ambassador indicated personal belief this good advice and promised convey to Foreign Minister prior latter's departure Madeira.

Herter ACTING

(082)

HERTER

771.022/3-1358

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RM/R

Anal 21

Rev

Cat

Drafted by:
EUR:WE:HBTompson:paw 3/13/58Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

EUR - C. Burke Elbrick

Clearances:

S/S CR

MAR 13 1958 P.M.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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SECRET

54 51
Action

EUR
Info
RMR
FROM: Madrid

TO: Secretary of State

SS NO: 988, March 14, 9 p.m.

G SP C W L
IO INR AF WMSC OSD
PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 988 REPEATED INFORMATION RABAT 81 PARIS 163
LONDON 72

In absence Foreign Minister (EMBTEL 975), I saw Admiral Carrero Blanco, Acting Foreign Minister, and Sedo, Director General Foreign Policy with Armstrong last evening to carry out instructions DEPTEL 1127 and 1131.

I made full presentation in accordance instructions pointing up particularly US efforts in Rabat to restrain GOM from military adventures and our endeavor to get GOM resume negotiations with GOS in view latter's assurances has no intention of attacking Morocco. I said status regarded Spanish desire for prior negotiation as reasonable and had so informed GOM but that we felt armed resistance to GOS if no prior negotiation took place would prejudice world opinion since Spain had agreed in 1956 that Southern Zone should go to GOM. I stressed advantages to position of GOS if it were to adopt suggestion in EMBTEL 1131 of announcing publicly after notice to GOM its unilateral withdrawal from Southern Zone to below 27-40 boundary. I expressed US strong hope that hostilities would not be resumed especially in Ifni but rather that path in resumption of negotiations would be smoothed by another GOS public offer to submit Ifni matter to arbitration.

Acting Foreign Minister in lengthy reply reiterated willingness GOS negotiate settlement in respect Ifni the boundaries of which he said had never been rigidly fixed and were of no great importance. He indicated that GOS wishes retain some rights in enclave, but was not specific as to details. Said Spain had felt matter was far along toward solution at time of initial AOL attack

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-2- 988, March 14, 9 p.m., from Madrid

attack in November and had never been able understand why GOM condoned military aggression. He went on that Spanish should put little faith in Rabat's assertion that it prepared have RMA take over Southern Zone area because Spanish fully aware extent to which AOL has been and is now being "incorporated" in RMA units which, GOS feels, would be those sent take charge in Southern Zone, thereby, in effect achieving objectives so-called AOL. He elaborated GOS conviction that Communist influence, and indeed direct support, is very present in this situation. Acting Foreign Minister said in such case GOS could only regard this as Communist victory in critical area Northwest Africa which had been objective of Moscow since 1920.

Acting Foreign Minister said Spanish consider as a fiction the Moroccan claim AOL is independent and indigenous force seeking to free area from foreign domination. He went on to say US could perform signal service to world by taxing GOM directly with question of whether it controlled AOL or not. If Rabat should reply that it does not control AOL then it is admitting that it does not control the area occupied by AOL and could not maintain order therein. On other hand, should Rabat acknowledge control AOL or refuse to answer, GOM must shoulder responsibility for aggression against Spanish territory.

Sedo argued that without guarantee of southern boundary of Morocco including Southern Zone, Spain, if it pursued course suggested by US of withdrawl from Zone without negotiation, must assume that once area had been occupied by Moroccans, pistol would again be put to Spain's head for further territorial encroachment. He and Acting Foreign Minister emphasized that Spain could not disregard explicit threats to its African territory contained in speeches Moroccan King Al Fassi and most recently Minister Interior. Acting Foreign Minister warned that one inch south of 27-40 Spain would fight and, bearing in mind 38th parallel situation in Korea, Spain would invade territory to north in order to destroy sources of aggression.

Throughout interview it was evident that Spanish position naturally changed as result of King Mohamids' speech February 25. Spaniards still willing negotiate settlement with Rabat but while contacts between Madrid and Rabat continue negotiations regarding RMA take-over in Southern Morocco do not appear to be progressing. While Acting Foreign

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-3- 988, March 14, 9 p.m., from Madrid

Acting Foreign Minister authorized me specifically to inform US that Spain has desire to avoid hostilities in Southern Morocco even if RMA takeover without prior negotiations, he subsequently indicated the difficulty of the situation by pointing out that it was impossible to identify which forces are AOL and which are RMA. Acting Foreign Minister pointed out that 1956 agreements terminating Spanish Protectorate provided for specified number of Spanish military in Northern Zone but was indefinite as to number in Southern Zone. Nevertheless, Spanish troops in latter (although number very small) are there by agreement with GOM just as in north; question of the number to remain was still to be negotiated and this was but one of several reasons why negotiations were important. Administrative takeover by RMA would depend, of course, upon their ability either to absorb or control AOL. He pointed out Spanish had paid Moroccan troops until last January.

Prior to King Mchamids speech, Areilza had informed me of his hope that personal meeting between Franco and King might provide opportunity for peaceful settlement. I asked Acting Foreign Minister if it would not be a good idea for Franco to invite King to visit Spain. Acting Foreign Minister replied that Spanish public opinion would hardly be receptive to such a visit at this time. In light of 1956 declaration and Moroccan failure to control the territory they claim, Spaniards feel overwhelming preponderance of responsibility for present conflict derives from initial decision (whether King's or not) to attack Ifni and from subversive influences working to exacerbate and inflame relations between Morocco and Spain. These factors are aggravated by view that Moroccans have solidified on the position of their redentist extremists and have unmasked their intentions and territorial ambitions.

It is thought in some quarters here that in part because of King's obligations to Al Fassu and the Istiqlal in connection with his return from Madagascar, the King may have become a prisoner of the Istiqlal.

North African fighting appears to be generally unpopular throughout the country and the main issues have not been effectively and publicly stated. General Barroso told me that deaths so far are extremely low. There is responsible opinion to the effect that the senior officers of the Spanish Army in particular, were disappointed

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-4- 988, March 14, 9 p.m., from Madrid

disappointed by the 1956 declarations of Moroccan independence and that given the political power of the Army, it is now extremely difficult for Franco to give into Moroccan aggression without irreparable loss of face and prestige which might constitute a dangerous threat to the regime.

LODGE

AB:LMS:LAS/4

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 CHARGE TO**Department of State****SECRET****Classification**

1958 MAR 15 PM

0801

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SENT TO: RABAT PRIORITY 944 65271

REPEATED INFO: Madrid 1159
Paris 3380
London 6557
171.022.

RefDeptel 921

Spanish Ambassador today furnished us with summary of telegram from
~~Madrid~~Madrid which stated: Moroccan government had refused offer of Foreign
to GOSMinisters meeting on grounds that its note of November 11, 1957 had not been
answered. ~~by Spanish Government~~ GOS has hence now decided present draft
note to Rabat which would reaffirm its willingness transfer Southern Zone
as it is defined Article II Treaty November 27, 1912 and of which following
are two most important passages:

1. QTE Spanish Government reiterates its willingness undertake ~~xxxxxx~~
conversations with GOM with object of arriving by common accord at
a formula of transfer by ~~xxxxxx~~
territories remain duly guaranteed. ~~xxx~~ Unte

2. Qte The Spanish Forces, in accordance with the Protocol to the
joint declaration of April 7, 1956, could remain stationed in
said territories until the signing of a definitive accord ~~xxxxxx~~
be

~~xxxxxx~~ and a commission/designated for the purpose of placing ~~xxxxxx~~
on the limits corresponding to parallel 27-40 of our common frontier. ~~xxxxxx~~

RM/R	63
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Cat	-----

Drafted by: EUR:W:JJava ~~SSX~~

AF:AFN:JABovey TAB:

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

Joseph J. Java

Clearances:

WE: Mr Torbert ~~SSX~~**SECRET****Classification**UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
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Classification

Paragraph

Rabat should inform Spanish Ambassador of above and attempt obtain text draft note or futher clarification its contents and what is contemplated or has ensued with GOM.

If our understanding correct that Spanish troop withdrawal would depend on designation commission for delimitation southern parallel and signature accord on troops, this may present problem for GOM, particularly since conditions prevailing at time transfer Northern Zone no longer exist and presence both Spanish troops and RMA likely cause friction. Embassy should therefore be wary endorsing to GOM specific Spanish proposals which would involve US in responisibilities for incidents which might ensue .

However if draft note ~~mandates~~ embodies Spanish agreement to RMA effective and Moroccan administration taking over/sovereignty in Southern Zone without conditions and relegates latter to question troop withdrawal, it would appear constitute definite advance on part GOS. Therefore unless conversation with Spanish Ambassador indicates inadvisable do so, you should inform BALAFREJ Spanish have informed us their intention submit draft note on Southern Zone and express our hope GOM will lend sympathetic ear their proposals with view arriving at mutually acceptable way effecting transfer.

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(aw)* HERTER

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Control: 9745

Rec'd: March 15, 1958
3:23 pm

FROM: Rabat

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 985, March 15, 6 pm

St. Lw

SENT DEPARTMENT 985, REPEATED INFORMATION PARIS 368, MADRID 100,
CASABLANCA, TANGIER UNNUMBERED.

Boucetta of Foreign Office when queried on relations with Spain reported no word from latter on Moroccan demands for return Southern Zone, nothing positive brought back from Madrid by Spanish Ambassador and no abatement of tension in Moroccan south.

Following trips to Agadir Province of Crown Prince and Minister of Interior latter reported that 6,000 refugees had arrived in province from Ifni, and 6,000 more from Spanish West Africa, Maroc Meridionale, Mauretania and Tindouf. AL ALAM sharply takes French press in Morocco to task for failure send representatives with journalist group that went south to investigate refugee problem at Foreign Ministry's invitation or publish any resulting press agency despatches. AL ALAM says attitude local French press imposes on government duty to boycott it and bar its representatives from Moroccan activities. "We have no need," says AL ALAM, "of press which serves aims of colonialists and keeps important French colony (in Morocco) ignorant of realities."

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Control: 10407
Rec'd: MARCH 17, 1958
1:32 PM

FROM: RABAT

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 992, MARCH 17TH.

Stoker

SENT DEPARTMENT 992; REPEATED INFORMATION PARIS 371, MADRID 102,

COMMUNIQUE 41 MARCH 11 OF ARMY OF LIBERATION IN MOROCCAN SAHARA CLAIMS THAT LARGE-SCALE FRENCH-SPANISH OFFENSIVE BEGAN LATE FEBRUARY IN SEGUIA EL HAMRA, RIO DE ORO AND MAURITANIAN BORDER. COLONIALIST FORCES "DESTROYED ALL STRATEGIC CENTERS AND WATER HOLES THIS PART OF MOROCCO," DIRECTED "INCENDIARY BOMBS AND DEADLY GAS ON CIVIL POPULATIONS AND THEIR LIVESTOCKZ AND MADE VICTIMS OF "HUNDREDS OF WOMEN, CHILDREN AND DEFENSELESS MEN." ENEMY LOSSES AT HANDS AOL: "235 DEAD, LARGE NUMBER OF WOUNDED, 10 VEHICLES PUT OUT OF ACTION, 12 OTHER VEHICLES BURNED, ONE PLANE SHOT DOWN CAUSING DEATH OF THREE OFFICERS." AOL LOSSES: "16 MARTYRS AND SMALL NUMBER WOUNDED."

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10225 MAR 17 PM 4 0

Control: 10225

(ML)

Rec'd: March 17, 1958
9:23 a.m.

FROM: Paris

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 4259, March 17, 1 p.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 4259; REPEATED INFORMATION MADRID 131, RABAT 256.

DEPTEL 3353.

In compliance reference telegram we conveyed to Foreign Office (Basdevant) March 14 substance of developments Moroccan-Spanish relations.

Basdevant confirmed that French early last week had made to both Spanish and Moroccans demarches very similar to ours, urging that force not be used by either side.

French in effect told Spanish all action outside Ifni zone could have very serious reaction, and stated hoped see problem of Ifni settled by peaceful negotiations. Stated GOF could not contest sovereignty of Morocco over southern zone north of 27 longitude 40 latitude line and counted on Spanish not use force to oppose effective extension Moroccan sovereignty this area. Added GOF hoped transfer of powers would be effected on basis agreement between GOM and GOS.

In parallel demarche to GOM, latter informed of GOF demarche to GOS and told that GOF counted on GOM not use force to cross borders Ifni zone but rely on pacific means. GOF also put GOM on guard against forceful action directed against southern zone and stated hoped transfer of sovereignty would be effected peacefully.

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FROM: Rabat

Control: 12137

Rec'd: March 19, 1958

4:06 p.m.

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1006, March 19, 7 p.m.

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1958 MAR 20

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TO THE RM/A CENTRAL FILES*Balafrej*

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 1006; REPEATED INFORMATION PARIS 378, MADRID 107
LONDON 118.

DEPTEL 944

Spanish Ambassador yesterday confirmed substance draft text but seemed unaware Spanish Ambassador Washington had been authorized to communicate it to US. He did not offer to supply me copy and I did not press for it first because he said GOM suggesting only minor changes and everything going so well agreement should be reached and changeover effected in next few days; and, second, because in reviewing US transactions in recent weeks in Madrid, Washington and Rabat I felt that we are dangerously close to point where exercise of formal good offices may be requested if things again go wrong.

His reassurances seemed almost too good to be true so I thought it best to check with Balafrej for GOM version. When I said to Balafrej this morning it looked like step in right direction he said that until today he thought it was more than that and they were indeed close to agreement. Also on the question of Spanish troops remaining temporarily along side GOM forces he said there would be no problem. However, everything had changed this morning. Spanish Ambassador had just come in with new stipulation that GOM "guarantee there will be no new aggression from Morocco against Spain". He considered this preposterous and deliberately offensive. He said Spanish Ambassador had put this forward on new instructions and had no discretion for modifying it. Balafrej rejected it out of hand and considers situation has taken grave turn and "other solution" must be found next few days. I calmed him down and he promised to keep on with talks. He professed to have no idea of reason

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~~SECRET~~

-2- 1006, March 19, 7 p.m., from Rabat

reason for Spanish stiffening and rejected my mild suggestion it might be reaction etkirkais* much publicized activities and statements at Washington and New York. Nonetheless I think that as he reflects on this it may worry him. Best explanation he could come up with was that Spanish military had stepped in and prevented Foreign Office from going on with accord which really seemed to be nearly complete.

Within half hour Spanish Ambassador got hold of me. He took back much of what he told me yesterday but was far from rank about new "development". He used exactly same language as regards guarantee but did not admit it was result of new instruction. He claims though not convincingly that it is inherent in spirit of text. He also is worried and says he must now negotiate with his own Foreign Office.


It may be that Balafrej to push us farther along path of good offices is exaggerating firmness of Spanish demand, but Spanish Ambassador's version is obviously factitious.

Balafrej considers question of cession southern protectorate already negotiated and not subject to bargaining. "It really does not need any formal agreement at all but for orderly conduct of relations a document would be mutually courteous and appropriate". Once this out of way he is even anxious to take up in personal meeting with Castiella full discussion all other problems. In view this expressed attitude GOS might be well advised not to insist on stipulations which risk open conflict instead of unfavorable course negotiations were taking.

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AAL:MAA

*As received. Verification upon request.



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CORRECTION

3/20/58, 8 p.m.

Control: 12137
Rec'd: March 19, 1958
4:06 p.m.
AM 7 31

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F W 771.022/3-1958

CJC

FROM: Rabat
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 1006, March 19, 7 p.m.

Noteed
EUR: WE
3/21/58
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Attach this numbered correction to each copy of Rabat's 1006 previously distributed to you.

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY

MAR 21 1958

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FW 771.022/3-1958

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Confidential File

FW 771.022/3-1958

TO : NEA - Mr. Rountree
FROM : AF - Joseph Palmer 2nd *JP per JP*
SUBJECT : Your Appointment with Dr. Laraki at 3:30 p.m.,
Friday, March 21.

h
Dr. Ahmed Laraki, Chief Moroccan Delegate to the last session of the UNGA, is here on a "mission of information", with particular reference to Morocco's current problems with Spain.

*TR C 100
652.1*
In discussing this matter, Dr. Laraki will probably take the line that there are at present two principal problems: (1) The transfer of the Southern Zone of Morocco, which is recognized by both Governments as belonging to Morocco and is therefore covered by the Joint Declaration of Independence (April 7, 1956). This the Spanish ought to turn over without conditions as they did the Northern Zone; and (2) Other territorial and military matters (Ifni, the Spanish Sahara, status of Spanish forces) which Morocco is willing to settle by negotiation. He may also mention the problem of refugees from the Sahara, resulting from Joint French-Spanish operations, though he has as yet presented no request for help in this matter.

I recommend that you take the following line:

(1) We are glad the King and his Government are trying to work out their problems with Spain by peaceful negotiation.

(2) We are hopeful that the Southern Zone problem can be settled, and that this will open the way to peaceful settlement of other problems.

(3) We have tried to be of assistance on these questions both in Rabat and Madrid and will continue to do what we can, without of course engaging the United States Government in responsibility for settlement.

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4. If Laraki mentions the UN (he has just been in New York), I suggest you tell him we hope Morocco will exhaust every possibility of bilateral negotiation before getting involved in UN machinery.

We had thought on March 19 that, thanks partly to our own efforts both in Madrid and Rabat, the Southern Zone problem was about to be settled. Something seems to have gone wrong at the last moment, but we are not sure just what. (See Rabat 1006-Tab A). We have asked the Spanish Embassy here about this and instructed Madrid to do the same. It may be that Laraki is not yet aware of this development and unless he mentions it, I believe it best not to bring it up.

I attach a memorandum of my conversation with Laraki on March 17. (Tab E).

Dr. Laraki will be accompanied by Mr. Norland.

Concurrence

WE

Mr. Jova *[Signature]*

Attachments:

1. Rabat telegram 1006. (Tab A)
2. Memorandum of Conversation
dated March 17. (Tab B). — 652-71/3-1738

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P UOP IRC OCB USIA CIA OSD ARMY NAVY AIR GOM continues within context of continuing intensive Franco-Moroccan discussions to press for meeting of frontier commission, French Embassy reports. French have replied that Moroccan claims are so exaggerated and gap between French and Moroccan positions so great that there is no point of activating commission. In order to perform useful work, commission must have terms of reference setting forth problem in terms susceptible of resolution. French maintain that while certain borders patently undefined, general area in which border lies is known and commission should devote itself to determining frontier within this general area.

Foreign Office official in commenting on frontier commission stated that although El Fassi concept of southern domain of Moroccan not necessarily accepted by GOM there are certain areas well into Sahara ruled by French which are clearly Moroccan. After elaborating this viewpoint the stated French refused to recognize this and refused cooperation in permitting meeting of commission. This unfortunate because commission could at least be exploring for common ground which would be step in right direction. During conversation he made point that current series Franco-Moroccan talks not negotiations but merely "discussions" between two friendly nations.

As can be seen it appears that impasse has been reached in frontier question even before getting under way with little prospect that either side will compromise.

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Control: 18348
Rec'd: MARCH 28, 1958
1:37 PM

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EUR Info FROM: RABAT
RMR TO: Secretary of State
NO: 1051, MARCH 28, 6 PM

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Control: 18409

Rec'd: March 28, 1958
3:08 p.m.

FROM: Rabat

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1049, March 28, 6 p.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 1049; REPEATED INFORMATION PARIS 389, TUNIS 143,
ALGIERS 92, CASABLANCA, TANGIER UNNUMBERED.

Member Consultative Assembly's political committee tells us that commission set up to advise King on frontier question (EMBTEL 1048) will in due course perform similar role in connection foreign troops (French and Spanish) and US bases. Informant seemed confident latter two questions would be treated as distinct and separate issues. Commission has five members from Assembly (Ben Barka, Mahjoub Ben Seddik, a PDI member and two other assemblymen of minor importance) who will be joined by similar number personalities outside assembly chosen directly by King. Commissions role is presumably to appear to lend weight of public opinion to governments stand, but practical effect would seem to be to bring to fore role of Istiqlal leftwing as represented by Ben Barka and UMT leader Ben Seddik in policy formation.

Latter two have already found new scope for action in preparation for forthcoming Tangier conference on North African unity. Since conference is at party rather than government level, Ben Barka is bound to be key behind-scenes figure, though Balafrej will attend as Istiqlal secretary general. Ben Seddik, who approaches fanatical in criticisms of western collaboration against Arabs, together with Abderraham Youssefi, ex-AOL leader in Rif and Casablanca terrorism organizer, has been sent by Istiqlal to Cairo to contact FLNs CCE about Tangier conference.

Kadiri and Bennani of Istiqlal returned from Tunis yesterday. Former said he had been happy to note "identity of views" when discussing with Neo-Destour possibilities for translating North African unity into tangible facts but neither he nor anyone else has given clear idea of what these might be.

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Control: 18313

Rec'd: March 28, 1958
12:41 p.m.

FROM: Rabat

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1048, March 28, 4 p.m.

*At her*SENT DEPARTMENT 1048; REPEATED INFORMATION PARIS 388, CASABLANCA
TANGIER UNNUMBERED.

EMBTTEL 1011.

Continued pressure by Moroccans led French to agree in principle to meeting of Frontier Commission. In keeping with their more recent policy French resisted setting date for commencing work of commission for several weeks. In meantime Minister Foreign Affairs had prepared position paper on frontier which submitted to King. Instead of indicating approval or disapproval King somewhat unexpectedly called upon POL Committee of Consultative Assembly to appoint sub-committee which with addition of certain competent citizen members to be appointed by King would give advice on frontiers. Among those selected for sub-committee was Ben Barka who in turn called for report submitted to King for sub-committee consideration.

French stalling tactics apparently hit paydirt because press reports that due to necessity of presence of Balafrej at Accra conference in middle April and afterwards at Tangier for Istiqlal-FLN-Neo Destour meeting as Secretary General of Istiqlal, Frontier Commission could only meet sometime in May.

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Date MAR 31, 1958
From MADRID
To SECSTATE

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771.022/4-158

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34-32

Action

EUR

FROM: Lisbon

Control: 255

Info

Rec'd: April 1, 1958

RMR

8:08 a.m.

SS

TO: Secretary of State

1958 APR 1 PM 12 07

G

SP

SENT MADRID 32, REPEATED INFORMATION DEPARTMENT 459, RABAT 5

C

L

Reference Madrid telegram 33, sent Department 1073.

INR

AF

Both Foreign Office and International Police (PIDE) deny
categorically that either Castiella or Balafrej are in
Portugal.

UOP

IRC

OCB

CIA

OSD

CV/1

BONBRIGHT

Confidential File

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AIR

Control: 582

Rec'd: April 1, 1958
2:06 p.m.

FROM: Rabat

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1067, April 1, 3 p.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 1067, REPEATED INFORMATION MADRID 133

In informing us of secret meeting to take place between Balafrej and Castiella at Lisbon this week, Spanish Embassy said object was through personal encounter Foreign Ministers try to clear atmosphere and to learn just what Morocco's further intentions with regard to territory are. Embassy thought agreement on turn-over of southern zone was likely provided there were no last-minute hitches, but that there would have to be subsequent contacts between military commanders on actual arrangements and this might take little time. Spanish Embassy said agreement on turn-over would cite language 1912 convention on boundaries protected zone and that GOS was relying on assurances that Royal Moroccan Army would assume control as protection against AOL infiltration of zone. Embassy noted relatively large strength of RMA in southern Morocco and implied it was this as much as anything that GOS was banking on.

CANNON

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ARMY

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Control: 1462

Rec'd: April 2, 1958
2:08 p.m.

FROM: Rabat

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1081, April 2, 6 p.m.

Stokes

SENT DEPARTMENT 1081, REPEATED INFORMATION MADRID 115, PARIS 404,
ALGIERS, LONDON, TUNIS, CASABLANCA, TANGIER UNNUMBERED.

Press reports of Balafrej-Castiella meeting Lisbon do not yet make clear just what Spanish said that so upset GOM (EMBTEL 1080). It is unfortunate but perhaps inevitable that recrimination should slip into occasion that could be one for mutual congratulation. On both sides main effort is evidently directed to establishing that no more was given away than intended. Moroccan Foreign Minister concentration on Spanish statements rather than victory won suggests considerable nervousness lest Balafrej be attacked locally for going too far in limiting Morocco's freedom to push on with wider Saharan ambitions.

CANNON

CWD:ET/5

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
Action
EUR
Info
RMR
AF

FROM: Lisbon
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 461, April 2, 8 p.m.

Control:
Rec'd:

1626
April 2, 1958
5:31 p.m.

KB
7
Truel



SENT DEPARTMENT 461, REPEATED INFORMATION RABAT 6, MADRID 34.

Reference EMBTEL 459.

I should have stood in Sintxal!

BONBRIGHT

LR: OM/2

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1958 APR 3 PM 137
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01881

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SENT TO: Amembassy, LISBON
RPTD INFO: Amembassy, MADRID

528
1269
4-258
771.022/4-258


Embtel 461.

Please send earliest open airmail full text Spanish Embassy communiqué
Spanish Moroccan talks.

DULLES

771.022/4-258

Dulles
55



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(Offices
Only)

Drafted by:

EUR:WE:FHSacksteder:paw 4/3/58

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

EUR:WE - Joseph J. Jova

Clearance:

ea8/
S/S-CR
refile

APR 3 1958 P.M.

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Action

Control: 2361

Rec'd: APRIL 3, 1958
1:26 PM

AF FROM: RABAT

Info TO: Secretary of State

RMR SS NO: 1080, APRIL 2.

G SP C L INR EUR P UOP IRC OCB USIA CIA OSD ARMY NAVY AIR
SENT DEPARTMENT 1080, REPEATED INFORMATION MADRID 114, PARIS 403, LONDON, TUNIS, ALGIERS, CASABLANCA, TANGIER UNNUMBERED.

MOROCCAN FOREIGN MINISTRY ISSUED FOLLOWING COMMUNIQUE THIS MORNING:

"MINISTRY FOREIGN AFFAIRS DENIES CATEGORICALLY THAT THERE WAS JOINT COMMUNIQUE AFTER MEETING AT LISBON BETWEEN FOREIGN MINISTERS MOROCCO AND SPAIN. NEWS TO THIS EFFECT COMES SOLELY FROM OFFICIAL SPANISH SOURCE. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS MAKES CLEAR THAT THERE HAS BEEN AGREEMENT FOR TRANSFER TO MOROCCAN AUTHORITIES OF FORMER SOUTHERN ZONE OF SPANISH PROTECTORATE ON APRIL 10, 1958 AND NOTHING MORE. MR. BALAFREJ REFUSED TO RECOGNIZE SOUTHERN FRONTIERS OF SAID ZONE AND MOST EXPRESSLY RESERVED MOROCCAN POSITION WITH REGARD TO THEM.

EVERYTHING PUBLISHED BEYOND THIS COMES EXCLUSIVELY FROM SPANISH SOURCE WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE OF MOROCCAN MINISTER FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS EXPRESSES ITS ASTONISHMENT AT PUBLICATION SUCH COMMENTS, CONTRARY TO ALL DIPLOMATIC USAGE." H

FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN SAID SOLE OBJECT MEETING AT SINTRA (LISBON) - WHICH CAME AS SURPRISE TO MOROCCAN PUBLIC - WAS TO FIX DATE FOR TRANSFER. SPAIN PREVIOUSLY WISHED TO IMPOSE UNACCEPTABLE CONDITIONS, BUT THESE HAD BEEN WITHDRAWN. MOROCCAN GOVERNMENT WAS GRATIFIED WITH ACCORD REACHED.

SPOKESMAN EXPLAINED THAT STATUS 1,500 SPANISH TROOPS IN SOUTHERN ZONE WAS COVERED BY APRIL 7, 1956, AGREEMENT BETWEEN SPAIN AND MOROCCO AND WOULD BE RESOLVED WITHIN GENERAL FRAMEWORK MOROCCO'S FOREIGN TROOPS PROBLEM. ABOUT SPANISH COMMENTARY THAT SPANISH SOVEREIGNTY OVER

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-2- 1080, APRIL 2, FROM RABAT

IFNI REMAINED UNCONTESTED, MOROCCAN SPOKESMAN SAID SPAIN WAS ALONE IN
NOT RPT NOT CONTESTING IT. HE AGAIN EMPHASIZED BALAFREJ RESERVES
ON SOUTHERN LIMIT ZONE, PRESENTLY FIXED AT 27 DEGREES 40 MINUTES.

CANNON

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1612 DOCUMENTS
1612 DOCUMENTS

INCOMING TELEGRAM

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R M/R- File

JJJ per
paw

32

Action

EUR FROM: Rabat

RMR TO: Secretary of State

SS NO: 1100, April 7, 1 p.m.

G info Paris, Madrid, London, Tunis,
SP Algiers, Dakar, Tangier, Casablanca.

C SENT DEPARTMENT 1100, REPEATED INFORMATION MADRID 116, PARIS 411,
L LONDON, ALGIERS, TUNIS, DAKAR, CASABLANCA, TANGIER UNNUMBERED.

IO

INR Foreign Minister who returned Friday from Lisbon talks with
AF Spanish Foreign Minister tells me he is satisfied with agreement
UOP but never experienced a negotiation so difficult because of
IRC touchiness and tense atmosphere. He says that contrary to
prior understanding Castiella put before him for signature text
OCB containing all three preconditions (see EMBTEL 938 and 1051).

CIA Twice talks were broken off at heated moment and during second
OSD and longer pause while Castiella perhaps in contact with Madrid,

he Balafréj drew up counterproposal which toward evening Castiella
with bad grace accepted. He believes Castiella with whom he has
always got along very well is under personal emotional stress be-
cause of nostalgic association with Spanish role in North Africa
in earlier days whereas it now appears rather to Balafréj's sur-
prise that Franco is much more aware of practical realities of
evolution of modern Africa. He asked me to convey to Department
and to Embassy at Madrid his belief that agreement would not have
been possible without friendly effort of US.

He says his position on southern frontier rather badly expressed
in GOM public statement. All GOM means is that 27.40 line is
that of former protectorate and therefore determinant for purpose
of present negotiations. He told Castiella he is willing at any
time to get on with general examination of frontiers and especially
Ifni question. He can understand why this was coldly rejected
at this juncture; perhaps after appropriate interval US could help
get such talks started if as GOM truly hopes transfer of southern
territory on tenth can be effected in smooth and considerate way.

958

CANNON

LMS:ET/5

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OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
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Action

1958 APR 7 PM 4 Control: 4001

Rec'd: April 7, 1958
1:49 p.m.

EUR FROM: Lisbon

Info RMR TO: Secretary of State

AF NO: 469, April 7, 6 p.m.

NO⁷

NC

Reference: Department's telegram 528, April 3.

After Castiella-Balafrej meeting at Sintra last week we inquired of Spanish Embassy re communique and were informed none would be issued. Spanish Embassy again confirmed today that no communique had been issued and that only public account of meeting was EFE news story which appeared in Portuguese and Madrid press. EFE story being forwarded Department open airmail today.

771 • 022/4-758

HBS

BONBRIGHT

LMS:HLH/1

This tel repeated
to Generalissimo
Rabat 4/8/58
by EUR:WE:
f/t Sacheteder



MAY 16 1958

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
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**OUTGOING
TELEGRAM**INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO**Department of State****OFFICIAL USE ONLY**
ClassificationSENT TO: **Amembassy, RABAT**

1059

(Code Room: Please repeat Lisbon telegram No. 469 dated April 7,
1958.)*Re Castiella - Balafrey
mtg at Sintet no
southern zone*1958 APR 9 PM
04511THIS DOCUMENT MUST BE RETURNED
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771.022/47758

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WS

EUR:WE - Joseph J. Jova

Drafted by:
EUR:WE:FS Backsteder, Jr.:spaw 4/8/58Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

Clearances:

✓
EUR ✓ S/B-EN

APR 9 1958 PM

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**OUTGOING
TELEGRAM**INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO**Department of State****CONFIDENTIAL****Classification**SENT TO: Amembassy, MADRID 1285
Amembassy, RABAT 10491958 APR 7 PM 7 03
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Origin

Info:

Spanish Charge' called at Department to inquire our reactions on Castiella-Balafrej meeting. He was told that while we have not yet received full reports we understand that mutually satisfactory arrangements concluded turn over Southern Zone April 10. We have from beginning followed with interest and sympathy attempts both parties settle outstanding difficulties by peaceful means; fact that agreement now reached re Southern Zone reflects credit on wisdom and statesmanship of both Foreign Ministers.

Charge' expressed concern that Moroccan communique' refusing recognize southern borders Zone might have effect weakening Castiella's position in Spain and was indication continued Moroccan expansionist ambitions. Department expressed regret that communique's had given rise to mutual recriminations which we hoped would soon blow over. It was Department's hope that

success met by Mr. Balafrej in reaching agreement with Spain on Southern Zone through friendly negotiation would strengthen position of moderate elements in Moroccan Government.

*Dulles
(38)*Dist.
Desired
(Offices
Only)RM/R
RM/R

Anal 21

Rev:-

Cat:-

Drafted by:

EUR:WE:JJJova:paw 4/7/58

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

EUR - Frederick W. Jandrey

Clearances:

WE - H. G. Torbert, Jr. *HCT*
*(cont)*AF/N - Mr. Bovey *BB*.**CONFIDENTIAL****Classification**SAC/OSB
APR 7 1958 P.M.UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
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OUTGOING TELEGRAM

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

Department of State

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Classification

SENT TO: Amembassy, MADRID - NIACT 1309
Amembassy, RABAT - NIACT 1079

RPTD INFO: Anembassy, PARIS 3808
Anembassy, LONDON 7285
Anembassy, TANGIER 352

Reference 1119 repeated Madrid 118.

FOR MADRID :

If appropriate you might point out to Castiella that Spain's gesture at Sintra did much for Spanish prestige and was valuable contribution toward relieving tensions in North African area. It would be unfortunate if incidents connected with turnover were to diminish effects this statesmanlike gesture.

**Dist.
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(Offices
Only)**

RM/R

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FOR RABAT:

1. Department endorses entirely position you have taken last paragraph
your 1119 and authorizes you repeat same to GOM under instructions.

Drafted by: EUR:WE:JJJova:spaw 4/11/58
NEA:AFN:MBovay

**Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:**

WE - H. G. Torbert, Jr.
EUR - ~~EDWARD GOMBERG~~

Clearances:

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2. Moroccan Minister here informed Department he had instructions draw USG attention to events. These could have gravest consequences and GOM prepared instruct RMA take over Southern Zone. In light Madrid 1113 Department representative told Minister there may have been local misunderstanding which did not represent decision Madrid.

771,022/4-958

XK 752.71

3. Can Embassy ascertain whether any routes feasible for access to Terfaya which do not pass south 27 degrees 40 minutes.

Dulles
HJ

DULLES

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
JUSTIFICATION FOR MULTIPLE-ADDRESS AND CIRCULAR TELEGRAMS

This form must be completed for all circular or multiple-address telegrams that are being sent to five or more posts by telegraphic means. The form must be attached to the telegram when forwarded to S/S-CR for clearance and to DC/T for transmission.

IMPORTANT INFORMATION IN PREPARING A CIRCULAR OR MULTIPLE-ADDRESS TELEGRAM:

1. See sections 145.42 and 145.43 of the Manual of Regulations and Procedures for addressing procedure.
2. Note that these sections explain how to use "By Pouch" indicator for posts not requiring information urgently by telegram.
3. Remember that most consular posts normally handle an extremely small volume of telegraph traffic and are not equipped to receive long telegrams or telegrams of dubious urgency.
4. In using all-inclusive addresses like "All Diplomatic Missions" there rarely should be an instance where telegraphic transmission to all posts can be justified; therefore, make sure maximum use has been made of "By Pouch" indicator.
5. Prepare two circulars rather than one when: (1) many posts require the information urgently but only a few need a full explanation; (2) the major part of a message is unclassified and only the Departmental comment or instruction need be classified.
6. When press releases have to be sent to posts telegraphically, first determine whether the release is being broadcast by the USIA Bulletin, thus making the telegram unnecessary for many posts. When a circular telegram is classified because it contains a press release sent out in advance of the release date, send the full text to only the posts needing full text; to other posts, send a brief digest so as to reduce post decipherment work.
7. For information on pouch transit times, consult your pouch schedule or call extension 4233 in DC/P for specific details. For technical assistance involving circular or multiple-address telegrams, call DC/T, extension 4324. If assistance was obtained from DC on this message, show below name of person consulted.

(Write in name of person in DC/P)

(Write in name of person in DC/T)

CERTIFICATION

Following certification to be completed and signed by person whose name appears in authorizing block of telegram form:

Telegram Identification: Date drafted 4/11/58 Drafting Office Symbol EUR:WE

The attached telegram has been prepared with full consideration of the above seven guidance points. The urgency of the subject matter makes it essential to send the message telegraphically to all posts shown. Pouch services will not provide sufficiently fast service except to those posts where the "By Pouch" indicator has been used.

X 

(Signature)
Joseph J. Jova

OFFICER-IN-CHARGE, FRENCH-IBERIAN AFFAIRS

(Typed name and organization symbol of authorizing officer)

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Department of State

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ARMY

NAVY

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Control: 5698

Rec'd: April 9, 1958
6:55 p.m.

123 APR 10 1958
7 42

OFFICE OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
MESSAGE CENTER

THIS TELEGRAM
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APR 10 1958

no action required
FBI Bureau

FROM: Madrid
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 1113, April 9, 10 p.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 1113, REPEATED INFORMATION RABAT 89, PARIS 180,
LONDON 77, LISBON, DAKAR UNNUMBERED.

Following based on conversation Embassy officer today with
Chief Foreign Office African Section who attended Sintra
conference:

1. GOS on whole pleased with settlement re southern protectorate
although realizing many important problems remain unsolved such
as Ifni, future of Spanish forces in Morocco, long range relations
of Spain and North Africa. Nevertheless important step taken in
right direction. Much now depends on goodwill Morocco.

2. Essential point deriving from Sintra accord is Spain has
now lived up to its treaty obligations and area to 27-40 is
maximum Moroccan hope to obtain from Spain in Sahara. Fact is,
he said southern protectorate should never have been defined as
such for 27-40 in unnatural frontier and Morocco ends at Draa
historically and practically. Morocco thus luckily reaped
territorial dividen because of unfortunate (for Spain) treaty
language (original intention of France and Spain was that
southern protectorate would be rich SUS area south of Agadir
but French in 1904-1912 persuaded Spain to take instead desert
area between 27-40 and Draa to compensate France for concessions
made to Germany around Cameroons). Morocco should now live up to
its treaty obligations which it recognized in 1913 letter from H
Sultan to Spanish King accepting treaty of 1912 and in 20th May W
1956 diplomatic convention with France agreeing to honor all C
prior agreements signed by France in name of Morocco (including
1912 treaty and 27-40 and excepting only French-US agreement
re bases).

3. Manner in which GOM behaves following takeover of sourthern
zone will have important bearing on settlement of Ifni and other

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-2- 1113, April 9, 10 p.m., from Madrid

questions. Moroccan reaction to Sintra so far has encouraged GOS. Regarding Ifni, although GOS considers 1860 treaty definitely ceded sovereignty over area to Spain, and "not just for fishing facilities" modern conditions seem to reduce importance of area to Spain (official emphasized he was speaking personally here) and disposition of territory should therefore not prove difficult obstacle in Spanish-Moroccan relations GOS, however would not react kindly to Morocco making political issue of Ifni in Security Council or UN in effort put Spain on defensive as "colonialist."

4. Spanish officials consider Balafre reasonable, honest, able person, and that there are other reasonable persons in GOM also. More extreme elements however may still cause serious difficulties.

5. GOS has no objection in principle to Maghreb Federation, wants to live with North African states as good neighbor. Algeria is main problem. France must adopt more generous attitude, is still to "geoistic".

6. Actual turnover of protectorate April 10 expected be simple affair, with Moroccan Crown Prince and General Mezzian (former Spanish General now a Moroccan commander) flying to Villa Bens where Prince presumably will make "great oration". Colonel commanding Spanish forces there will receive them as their host but not officiate at formal turnover ceremony as he will remain in command Spanish forces staying on. Spanish civil authority in zone disbanded 1956 so no civil turnover possible. Spanish only in Villa Bens as Tan Tan, Tilemson, Tuisguiremz, only important inland towns, were evacuated long ago. Spanish expect, in fact insisted, Royal Moroccan army will promptly enter area and occupy it up to 27-40, probably establishing main troop center alongside Spanish in Villa Bens.

Foreign Office scheduled press conference tonight about turnover.

DODGE

MGG:INK/5

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NID 897418

BDX 3660

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The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation 771.022/4-1058
MEMO
Date APR 10, 1958
From SPAN. EMB
To STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

Security-Classified Information

Otherwise Restricted Information

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11/2/89

Date

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Department of State

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Action

Control: 6347

Rec'd:

APRIL 10, 1958
12:55 PM

AF Info FROM: MADRID

[Signature]

gn

RMR TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1116, APRIL 10.

L IO INR EUR SENT DEPARTMENT 1116, REPEATED INFORMATION RABAT 90.

P UOP IRC MADRID PAPERS APRIL 9 CARRIED ITEM DATE LINED TANGIER
CITING ALLEGED SKIRMISH IN TETUAN ON APRIL 6 BETWEEN ROYAL
MOROCCAN ARMY ELEMENTS AND POLICIA ARMADA, DESCRIBED AS
BEING ADHERENTS OF LIBERATION ARMY. TWO CASUALTIES REPORTEDLY
RESULTED INCLUDING FORMER ASSISTANT TO GENERAL MEZZIAN.

OCB USIA CIA ARTICLE ALSO CLAIMED THIS IS SECOND SUCH CLASH IN PAST FEW DAYS,
BUT THAT MOROCCAN PRESS HAS REFRAINED FROM MENTIONING EITHER
INCIDENT.

771-022/4-1058

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LODGE

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PL no action
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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

771.022/41058

FROM : AMCONGEN TANGIER MOROCCO

162
DESP. NO.

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

April 10, 1958

REF :

27 For Dept. Use Only	ACTION * IRC-30 REC'D 415	DEPT. F OTHER O	REP-2 RM/R-2 AF-5 EHP-5 IN-7 ARMY-4 CIA-12
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SUBJECT: Transmitting Geological Map of Northern Zone of Morocco.

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TO THE RM/R CENTRAL FILES

There is enclosed a geological map of the former Spanish Zone of Morocco prepared by a special commission which had been appointed in 1952 by the Spanish Government to make a geological survey of the area.

According to a recent statement of the Delegate of the Department of Mines in the Northern Zone, a new geological map covering the entire country is to be prepared sometime in the future. The enclosed map, however, which has never been available to the public, is being transmitted for the Department's information.

771.022/4-1058

For the Consul General:

Enclosure:

Geological map of Northern Zone of Morocco

DEPT OF STATE
RECEIVED

653 APR 16 1958 10:03

IRC/M
Arthur L. Burt
MESSAGE CENTER
IRC/ICD
CENTER

cc: Rabat, Casablanca.

JPL
JRLavallee/ecj
REPORTER

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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31-D

Action

AF

Info
RMR

SS NO: 1119, April 11, 5 p.m.

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Control: 7139,

Rec'd: April 11, 1958

12:54 p.m.

FROM: Rabat

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1119, April 11, 5 p.m.

NIACT

SENT DEPARTMENT 1119, NIACT MADRID 118, REPEATED INFORMATION
PARIS 417, CASABLANCA, TANGIER UNNUMBERED.

Reference: EMBTEL 1113

Balafrej gave me more precise details this morning. He says Royal Moroccan Army started occupation Southern zone yesterday morning as agreed with Spanish but were stopped by Spanish military some miles from Tarfaya (Spanish Cabo Juby) first without any explanation and later by statement that road passes for some distance back into Spanish territory (Seguia El Hamra). Spanish refused passage even under observation their own troops who could assure continuous passage. Abdelkebir El Fassi, Director Saharan Affairs, and General Mazian, who were in area and from whom these reports come, are in Tarfaya, but under close Spanish escort. They say main part of village, with private houses, school, post office etc., encircled by barbed wire and Spanish declare it is "military base" which they will not give up. He confirmed what Boucetta told us last night but which we were loath to believe without confirmation that house of newly appointed Moroccan Governor Ali Ou Aida seized, household effects thrown out and damaged and wife and children abducted somewhere into Spanish Territory. Other residents also removed, some they think to Canaries. Deep well for subsidiary water supply for village destroyed.

He reported all foregoing to Spanish Ambassador last night who found it hard to believe, but in touch with Madrid for information and instructions. Crown Prince, whose ceremonial take over was scheduled for today, has postponed departure from Rabat.

GOM "has decided" to demand removal of Spanish troops as only effective counter-measure. UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

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-2- 1119, April 11, 5 p.m., from Rabat

effective counter-measure. This would involve also troops in former Northern zone, an important consideration being fear of incidents involving Spanish residents in Morocco generally. I made earnest recommendation for restraint and moderation, emphasizing particularly two points: withhold any drastic action until he hears Spanish side, and if decision really firm make it without mention of any time limit and in general terms so that it would be at least negotiable along lines of present talks with French. Best of all, of course, wait until all facts are available.

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File Designation 771.022/4-1158
TEL 1126
Date APR 11, 1958
From MADRID
To SAC STATE

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Authority Date

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Department of State

38-39

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Action

Control: 7070
Rec'd: April 11, 1958
11:17 a.m.

AF FROM: Madrid

Info RMR TO: Secretary of State

SS NO: 1120, April 11, 2 p.m.

G SP C L IO INR EUR PX PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 1120 REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY RABAT 91,
LONDON 79 PARIS 181

Queried on basis Rabat telegram 117 NIACT (but of course not naming source), Chief Foreign Office African section replied that telegrams received so far by Foreign Office from Villa Bens state six Moroccan planes landed there on tenth bringing Moroccan officials (unnamed) to take charge of change-over, and same day Royal Moroccan Army forces crossed Draa en route Villa Bens via Tantan. This was as expected by GOS and telegrams give no indication that Spanish forces in any way opposed this operation, nor could they have done so since only Spanish troops in protectorate are at Villa Bens where they are confined to barracks. Official said that on contrary it would be against specific instructions issued to Spanish commander Villa Bens, and to Spanish national interests for any obstacles to be placed now in way of turnover. Foreign Office now expects three Moroccan Ministers in addition to Crown Prince and Moroccan Generals Mexian and Kitani (EMBTEL 1113) to participate in turnover ceremonies at Villa Bens, but they probably will not (repeat not) arrive until today to allow time for Moroccan Army to traverse 200 kilometers from Tantan border to Villa Bens.

Official said that any report Spanish were impeding turnover must have emanated from Istiqlal extremists who still wished impede improvement Spanish-Moroccan relations. He sounded only one warning note -- if Moroccans try cross 27-40 parallel, Spanish troops will oppose them.

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Control: 7702
Rec'd: APRIL 12, 1958
6:47 AM

Info FROM: RABAT

RMR TO: Secretary of State

SS NO: 1122, APRIL 12

G SP C L IO
SENT DEPARTMENT 1122, REPEATED INFORMATION MADRID 119,
PARIS 418, CASABLANCA, TANGIER UNNUMBERED

INR FOLLOWING IS COMMUNIQUE ISSUED BY PALACE IN EARLY HOURS THIS
EUR MORNING:

P UOP
IRC
OCB USIA CIA OSD ARMY NAVY AIR
"FOLLOWING SPANISH-MOROCCAN ACCORDS CONCLUDED APRIL 1, IT HAD
BEEN AGREED THAT POWERS IN TEKNA WOULD BE TRANSFERRED TO MOROCCAN
GOVERNMENT APRIL 10. IN APPLICATION THESE AGREEMENTS, UNIT OF FAR
(ROYAL ARMED FORCES) BEGAN TO ENTER THIS REGION BEGINNING APRIL
10 IN EXPECTATION ARRIVAL CIVIL AUTHORITIES; BUT THIS UNIT
ENCOUNTERED DIFFICULTIES ON PART SPANISH AUTHORITIES, DIFFICULTIES
WHICH HAVE DELAYED ITS ARRIVAL IN TOWN OF TORFAYA AT HOUR PLANNED.
THIS IS WHY VOYAGE OF HRH CROWN PRINCE, CHIEF OF STAFF FAR, AT HEAD
MINISTERIAL DELEGATION, HAS BEEN POSTPONED UNTIL FORCES OF ROYAL
ARMY, WHO ARE CONTINUING THEIR MARCH, ARRIVE IN TOWN TERFAYA.
HOWEVER, HIS MAJESTY HAS INSTRUCTED NEW GOVERNOR TO JOIN HIS POST
IMMEDIATELY."

IMPRESSION THUS BEING GIVEN PUBLICLY IS THAT LAST MINUTE HITCH
HAS TEMPORARILY POSTPONED TAKE-OVER CEREMONIES SCHEDULED FOR TODAY.
KING MADE RADIO ADDRESS LAST NIGHT AS PLANNED IN CELEBRATION OF
TRANSFER AND DECISION ON POSTPONEMENT WAS EVIDENTLY NOT TAKEN UNTIL
SOME HOURS LATER.

KING SAID THAT JOY AND HAPPINESS MANIFESTED THIS WEEK BY INHABITANTS
TERFAYA ARE REFUTATION OF PROPAGANDA WHICH HAS ATTEMPTED TO
DISTORT NATURE OF MOROCCAN CLAIMS ON SAHARA. "WE HAVE NEVER
STOPPED REPEATING" SAID KING "AND WE REAFFIRM AGAIN TODAY THAT
WE HAVE NO EXPANSIONIST AIMS NOR DESIRE TO EXERCISE OUR DOMINATION
OVER OTHER PEOPLE. OUR SOLE DESIRE IS TO RECOVER TERRITORY
WHICH HAS BEEN INTEGRAL PART OUR COUNTRY FOR SEVERAL CENTURIES

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-2- 1122, APRIL 12, FROM RABAT

AND WHICH HAS BEEN DESPOILED IN EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES AND IN
VIRTUE SECRET AGREEMENTS."

ALI BOU (OR OU) AIDA, DESIGNATED BY KING YESTERDAY AS FIRST
GOVERNOR OF TERFAYA, IS PROMINENT MERCHANT IN SOUTHERN TERRITORIES
(INCLUDING MAURETANIA, RIO DE ORO AND IFNI), MEMBER OF ISTIQLAL
PARTY ONE OF TWO SAHARAN REPRESENTATIVES IN NATIONAL CONSULTATIVE
ASSEMBLY AND RECENTLY DESIGNATED MEMBER NATIONAL FRONTIERS
COMMISSION.

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Control: 7910

Rec'd: APRIL 12, 1958

4:34 P.M.

FROM: MADRID

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1127, APRIL 12, 4 PM

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 1127, REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY RABAT 93,
LONDON 82, PARIS 184.

REFERENCE: EMBTEL 1126.

CHIEF FOREIGN OFFICE AFRICAN SECTION IBANEZ TOLD EMBASSY
OFFICER LATE LAST NIGHT:

GOS HAD NO INKLING OF DIFFICULTIES WITH MOROCCAN TAKE-OVER
PARTY UNTIL WORD CAME OF BALAFREJ'S FRIDAY MORNING PRESS
CONFERENCE (GIST AS RECEIVED BY FOREIGN OFFICE CLOSELY
PARALLELED MAIN POINTS BALAFREJ'S STATEMENTS TO AMBASSADOR
CANNON REPORTED IN RABAT TELEGRAM 1119 TO DEPARTMENT).

IBANEZ THEN TELEPHONED CANARIES AND VILLA BENS FOR DETAILS,
ON BASIS OF WHICH FOREIGN OFFICE LAST NIGHT ISSUED ANSWERING
RELEASE TO FOREIGN AND LOCAL PRESS. ESSENCE THIS REPLY PLUS
COMMENTS BY IBANEZ FOLLOWS:

1. MOROCCAN FORCES WERE TURNED BACK BY SPANISH AT 27-40
PARALLEL BECAUSE NO CLEARANCE TO ENTER SPANISH TERRITORY WAS
REQUESTED BY MOROCCANS IN ADVANCE AND THERE WERE OTHER
ROADS TO VILLA BENS NORTH OF PARALLEL. APPARENTLY MOROCCAN
ARMY WAS UNFAMILIAR WITH GEOGRAPHY OF ZONE AND FAILED REALIZE
UNTIL THEY REACHED SPANISH OUTPOSTS THAT ROADS CROSSED
BORDER. BALAGREJ AND MOROCCAN GENERAL STAFF HAD 10 DAYS SINCE
SINTRA CONFERENCE TO WORK OUT QUESTION OF ROUTE FOR THEIR
FORCES BUT APPARENTLY FAILED DO SO. THEY COULD ONLY BLAME
THEMSELVES.

(IBANEZ ADDED CONFIDENTIALLY BALAFREJ REFUSED DISCUSS SUCH
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-2- 1127, APRIL 12, 4 PM, FROM MADRID.

DETAILS WITH CASTIELLA AT SINTRA. SAID LAST MINUTE EFFORTS CORSS FRONTIER THEREFORE SEEMED HAVE POLITICAL OVERTONES. PERHAPS BY PUBLICIZING SPANISH REFUSAL OF PASSAGE MOROCCANS INTENDED FOCUS PUBLIC ATTENTION ON ALLEGEDLY UNSATISFACTORY NATURE OF NEW BORDER AND BEGIN CAMPAIGN TO UNDERMINE IT. SAID IF SPANISH GAVE WAY AND ALLOWED PASSAGE, MOROCCANS WOULD THUS SET PRECEDENT FROM OUTSET OF SEEING NECESSITY OF THEIR USING ROADS SOUTH OF NEW BORDER FOR EAST-WEST COMMUNICATIONS IN ZONE WHEREAS IN FACT THERE WERE OTHER USEABLE ROUTES AND MOTORIZED VEHICLES COULD EVEN STRIKE DIRECTLY ACROSS DESERT. SAID SPANISH ALSO NOT INCLINED GRANT SPECIAL FAVORS IN THIS INSTANCE FOR ANOTHER REASON, NAMELY THAT MOROCCANS RECENTLY REFUSED SPANISH "FAVOR" OF ALLOWING SPANISH CITIZENS FROM MELILLA TO USE NEAR BY NADOR AIRFIELD FOR TRIPS TO AND FROM SPAIN WITHOUT GETTING MOROCCAN VISAS AND CUSTOMS CLEARANCES, SAYING PRESENT STATE OF MOROCCAN-SPANISH RELATIONS DO NOT WARRANT SUCH "FAVORS". IBANEZ SAID PARENTHETICALLY SIZE OF MOROCCAN FORCE WAS SURPRISING. MOROCCANS HAD SAID THEY WERE SENDING ONLY SMALL GROUP TO VILLA BENS FOR TAKE-OVER CEREMONY. FACT PRESENT FORCE WAS ABOUT 1500 AND ANOTHER FORCE HAD MOVED PROMPTLY TO OCCUPY TUISGUI NEAR ALGERIAN BORDER OF ZONE SUGGESTED MOROCCAN INTENTION MAY BE TO ESTABLISH WATCH AND CONTROL OF FRENCH AT TINDOUF.)

2. SOME BARRICADES IN PLACE AROUND SOME VILLA BENS BUILDINGS, BUT THESE NOT NEW. THEY WERE ERECTED TO GUARD AGAINST EARLIER VICIOUS AOL ATTACKS. MOROCCANS SHOULD NOT BE SURPRISED SEE SUCH PRECAUTIONS CONTINUED UNTIL ROYAL ARMY TOOK OVER AS REQUESTED BY SPANISH. (IBANEZ SAID CONFIDENTIALLY RELIABLY INFORMED MANY EX AOL FIGHTERS ARE IN ROYAL MOROCCAN FORCE NOW ADVANCING TO VILLA BENS.)

3. WELL FILLED IN WAS BRACKISH AND WAS ABANDONED SOMETIME AGO FOR THAT REASON. TWO SPANISH MACHINES FOR CONVERTING SEA WATER ARE STILL FUNCTIONING, ALTHOUGH MOST FRESH WATER COMES TO VILLA BENS AREA FROM CANARIES BY SHIP. MOROCCAN ARMY SHOULD HAVE REALIZED WATER PROBLEM IN DESERT REGIONS SUCH AS THEY ARE TAKING OVER. NOT UP TO SPANISH TO ARRANGE FOR THEIR SUPPLY UNLESS REQUESTED TO DO SO.

4. NO TRUTH

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-3- 1127, APRIL 12, 4 PM, FROM MADRID.

4. NO TRUTH TO REPORT OF REMOVAL TO SPANISH TERRITORY OF "ONE OF WIVES" AND SOME CHILDREN OF NEWLY APPOINTED MOROCCAN GOVERNOR OF ZONE. APPOINTMENT AS GOVERNOR OF MAN WHO, FORMERLY PROFITING GREATLY FROM FRIENDSHIP OF SPANISH, BECAME ONE OF INSTIGATORS OF ATTACK ON IFNI, WAS HARDLY FRIENDLY GESTURE BY GOM. (IBANEZ CONFIRMED MUCH OF OUR PREVIOUS INFORMATION ABOUT GOVERNOR-EMBTEL 1126. HE RECEIVED FRANCO IN HIS TENT IN 1950 NEAR IFNI, CATERED FOR SPANISH FAVORS, THEN TURNED TRAITOR. STILL HAS WIFE AND FAMILY IN BARCELONA, AS WELL AS PARIS AND OTHER PLACES, BUT TO BEST OF IBANEZ KNOWLEDGE, HE HAD NO FAMILY IN VILLA BENS, ONLY PROPERTY. IN ANY CASE, SAID NO FAMILY WAS SEIZED BY SPANISH AND SUCH WOULD NOT BE SPANISH INTEREST OR METHOD.)

IBANEZ THOUGHT "DIFFICULTIES" WERE MANUFACTURED BY MOROCCANS FOR POLITICAL MOTIVES AND WOULD SOON DISAPPEAR AND TAKE-OVER OCCUR DAY OR TWO LATER THAN EXPECTED. HE SEEMED THINK NO DANGER ANY ARMED CLASHES. AGAIN EMPHASIZED SPAIN, HAVING DECIDED TURNOVER PROTECTORATE, HAD NO WISH OR INTEREST CAUSE LAST MINUTE DIFFICULTIES.

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Department of State

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42-41

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Action

Control: 7921

AF

Rec'd: April 12, 1958

Info

5:40 p.m.

RMR

FROM: Rabat

File
R/R
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SS

TO: Secretary of State

G

NO: 1123, April 12, 7 p.m.

SP

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SENT DEPARTMENT 1123, REPEATED INFORMATION MADRID 120, PARIS 419

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Porter, when conveying respects Balafrej this morning, informed him of Department's support (Department telegram 1079), of position I had taken regarding current Terfaya difficulties. Balafrej was very appreciative of Department's interest and prompt response. He had seen Spanish Ambassador this morning and told him that Spanish troops would now have to withdraw, but without setting date.

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EL ALAM this morning blazons report of Spanish "siege" of Terfaya across front page, with lurid details of interference, depredations and deportations. Yesterday, however, Balafrej told press RMA was proceeding to Cabo Juby by alternate route, supporting impression created within government circles that take-over though postponed will be carried through as soon as possible.

Spanish Ambassador in replying Balafrej demarche (Embassy telegram 1119) has denied Moroccan accusations regarding situation at Cabo Juby, but has confirmed that Moroccan troops may not pass south of 27 degrees 40 minutes. (GOM has never asked Spanish permission do so. Seems unlikely it would and questionable whether permission would be given if asked).

Trail dipping for about thirty miles into Saguiat El Hamra is principal route from Morocco to Cabo Juby, but there are two alternate though more difficult and time-consuming routes, one branching off from main track before reaching 27 degrees 40 minutes, other along coast. (It is evidently former that RMA now following).

Spanish Embassy tells us Spanish authorities had arranged all facilities requested by Moroccans -- refueling for planes

carrying

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-2- 1123, April 12, 7 p.m. from Rabat

carrying Crown Prince and party, accommodations for them, et cetera. What Moroccans did not realize is that Cabo Juby is no town in proper sense but simply military post with surrounding agglomeration native huts and tents. Seat of Spanish administrative authority was not at Cabo Juby but at Tan-Tan, just south of Oued Draa.

Moroccans have also falsified the other facts, says Spanish Embassy. There is half-constructed well at Cabo Juby but it was abandoned some time ago when water proved saline. Water supply for Spanish garrison has had to be brought from Canaries. Family newly-appointed Governor has not resided at Cabo Juby for some time and story of "kidnapping" absurd. (Apparently Spanish authorities did require family move farther south to Spanish Sahara when Saharan troubles began).

Among EL ALAM accusations are that Spanish Military Governor has stated he is under formal instruction from Madrid deny passage RMA via Hakounia (identified as being within Terfaya), that Spanish military blocking land and sea communications with Morocco and that Spanish have stipulated Crown Prince must arrive without military escort and local population must not go to airport greet him.

Comment: As usual, fact and fiction difficult to distinguish. Spanish certainly do not like Ali Bou Aida's appointment, considering him one of worst agitators against Spanish authority and source of funds for AOL. Blatant publicity Moroccans giving to transfer was also irritating. (Spanish evidently assumed Moroccans would be content with symbolic transfer and that Terfaya would be annexed to Agadir Province as Balafrej had predicted to press). These factors may thus have led them to be less than cordial in receiving Moroccans. On the other hand, Moroccans have certainly gone about take-over in impolitic way.

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File Designation 771.022/4-1358
Date 13 APR 1958
From SPANISH EMBASSY
To STATS

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Authority

11/2/88
Date

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NND 897418
BX 3660

(34)
1115

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File Designation 771.022/4-1458
TEL 1134
Date APR 14, 1958
From MADRID
To SECSTAT

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11/2/84

Date

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Department of State

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59-52

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Action

Control: 9516

Rec'd:

April 15, 1958

7:37 p.m. APR 16 1958

EUR

FROM: Madrid

APR 6

AM

Info

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 1139, April 15, 8 p.m.

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**SENT DEPARTMENT 1139; REPEATED INFORMATION RABAT 95, PARIS 189,
LONDON 85.**

DEPTEL 1309.

As reported EMBTEL 1134 I talked morning April 12 with Sedo. When I conveyed substance first paragraph reference telegram he agreed incidents might diminish effect constructive span action taken at Sintra but said Castiella had already had facts investigated and explained publicly here. See EMBTEL 1127. In view this conversation and four calls at Foreign Office previous day on this subject by Embassy officers I felt it unnecessary seek immediate appointment with Castiella but will have opportunity this week discuss matter further with him.

771-022/4-1553

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 CHARGE TO**Department of State****CONFIDENTIAL**
Classification

1958 APR 15 1557 57

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SENT TO: Amembassy RABAT 1091

RPTD INFO: Amembassy PARIS 3837
" MADRID 1323

Origin

Info:

Moroccan Minister called April 12 to express GOM surprise at unfortunate events connection turnover Southern Zone. GOM hoped troubles would prove result local misunderstanding rather than decisions Madrid and would try settle peacefully. If this not possible, grave consequences might ensue including takeover Zone without GOS agreement.

no decisions would be taken

We expressed disappointment at turn events and hoped until situation clarified

We hoped Royal Moroccan Army would behave with moderation and GOM would take no rptd
no general measures adversely affecting relations with Spain. We said US following situation Madrid and Rabat but in any inquiries or efforts we might make we must be able count on calm and restraint GOM as well as GOS. This also essential for touchy period when Moroccan and Spanish troops would be living side by side in Zone. We stressed also importance GOM refraining from any attempt force passage on roads south 27 degrees 40 minutes and assuring any transit made only

RM/R with GOS permission.

Anal 63 Unless objection perceived Embassy Rabat should take similar line with

Rev ECHO OFF.

Oat Drafted by:

AF:AFN:JAB:rey,Jr:sct 4-15-58

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

AF - Joseph Palmer 2nd

Clearances:

WE - Mr. Jova

SAC
APR 15 1958 P.M.**CONFIDENTIAL**
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771-422-4-1558

AIRPOUCH

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(Security Classification)

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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : AmEmbassy Madrid

748

DESP. NO.

771022/4-1658

XIC 652.71

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

April 16, 1958

DATE

REF :

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4-19 AA-12 115/4-10 412/4-11 113/4-12		

SUBJECT: Some Contrasting Official Spanish and Moroccan Views on Relations between the Two Countries

0013-1 1958 3 0504

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During the recent tension concerning the turnover of the former Southern Protectorate of Morocco from Spanish to Moroccan control, the reporting officer had occasion to discuss the situation frequently with both Sr. Eduardo IBANEZ y Garcia de Velasco, Director of the African Political Affairs section of the Spanish Foreign Office, and (separately) with Mr. Dris BENYELUN, First Secretary for Political Affairs (and at the time Chargé) of the Moroccan Embassy in Madrid. Reported below are some of their principal and largely contrasting assertions and views (excepting and supplementing those already reported in Embtels 1113, 1120, 1126, and 1127 to the Department), which it is felt shed some further light on problems, both past and future, in Spanish-Moroccan relations and on the extent to which strong feelings and mutual distrust have developed on both sides.

The main subjects dealt with are:

1. The future of Spanish troops in Morocco.
2. General flavor of Spanish-Moroccan relations.
3. Attitudes towards probable future territorial problems -- Ifni, Ceuta and Melilla, and regions South of 27-40.

Prior to setting forth the views they expressed, the following biographic information about Messrs. Ibáñez and Benyelun is provided by way of background.

Biographic Information about Ibáñez and Benyelun

Both Ibáñez and Benyelun are promising young career diplomats of about the same age, both enjoying exceptionally good contacts with their superiors and more responsibility and access to high level information than is common for officials of their rank. Ibáñez, who has Second Secretary rank in the Spanish Foreign Service,

WNFraleigh/nd

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career list, is in his early 30's. Benyelun is 27. Ibáñez had 7 years of service at the Spanish Embassy in Paris before becoming head of the African Section. His selection for such a key post is typical of Foreign Minister CASTIELLA's present policy of putting young men who enjoy his confidence into key positions in the Ministry. Ibáñez's Paris experience gives him a special entré also with the new Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Mr. CORTINA, who was until recently Counselor of the Spanish Embassy in Paris. Ibáñez has also been to the US (he met his wife in San Francisco where she was a college student) and has had considerable experience in Morocco.

Benyelun became Chargé when his Ambassador, Mohamed Auad, was recalled to Rabat recently, and Benyelun said he does not expect his Ambassador to return as some shake-ups in the Moroccan Foreign Office are in the making. Benyelun comes from a well-to-do family in the fertile region of North Morocco around Alcazarquivir. He is related to both the present Moroccan Minister of Justice and the Governor of Tangier. He has lived in Spain for 9 years, and says he knows many of the Istiqlal leaders personally (including Balafrej) having worked with them when they were political exiles in Spain. He graduated from the Spanish Government's Diplomatic School (in which all career Spanish diplomats must take a two-year course after being admitted to the Service), in the same class with three younger men on Ibáñez's staff. Ibáñez, too, knows him well, and used to see him often; but in the last year or so Ibáñez says Benyelun has become much more aloof from his Spanish colleagues. Benyelun harbors an especially violent dislike for the French, so much so that he refuses to speak French although he knows it well. He has considerable sympathy, he says, for the Spanish, although not as much as he used to have. He is not married. He is very ambitious, and has already asked to be made Ambassador to a South American country as soon as Morocco opens missions there. Considering his contacts and ability, and the ~~lack~~ of more experienced personnel, he probably stands a good chance of getting such a job, especially if his relative, the Minister of Justice, becomes Moroccan Prime Minister, as it is rumored he may do.

Ibáñez has been very close to his Foreign Minister throughout the crisis in Spanish-Moroccan relations that has ebbed and flowed since last November. He attended the secret Sintra Conference on April 1, and the Balafrej-Castiella conference in Tangier last September.

So much for the sources. The following is a summary of information, and views, gathered from discussions with them.

The Future of Spanish Troops in Morocco

a. According to Benyelun. Benyelun said that the Moroccan Government made a formal request to the Spanish Government about a month ago for the early withdrawal of all Spanish troops from Moroccan territory. No final date for the withdrawal was mentioned. Observing that French forces are already being withdrawn as the result of a recent agreement, Benyelun said rather heatedly that it was no longer possible for Morocco, as an independent sovereign state to suffer the indignity of foreign troops on her soil. Then he quickly added that the presence of US forces in Morocco was a different matter, for they were there for a different reason and Morocco and the US had reached a satisfactory agreement in principle on the matter when the King was in Washington. All French and Spanish troops must go, however, and Morocco would not even consider joining a Western Mediterranean Pact or anything of that sort until they were withdrawn.

b. According to Ibáñez. Ibáñez told the reporting officer as recently as April 11 that no official request had yet been received from the Moroccan Government for the withdrawal of Spanish forces from Moroccan territory. He said he did not know what the attitude of his Government would be if such a request were made, but he, too, remarked that French troops are already being withdrawn.

He did say, however, in regard to the 1,500 Spanish troops which have remained in Villa Bens following the turnover to Morocco of the former Southern Protectorate, that he could see no important reason for Spanish troops to remain there. Villa Lens and the former Protectorate were no longer of any importance to Spain, he said. It was true, however, that some high ranking Spanish Army officers were of a different opinion, and there was a question of how much and how rapidly the military forces could be asked to withdraw and retreat without seriously impairing their morale.

Regarding the threat to Ceuta and Melilla, Ibáñez said that if the Moroccans cut off the water supply to either of those enclaves, they could still exist on internal water sources that have been developed, although rationing would be necessary.

(Note: Latest figures available to the Embassy's Army Attaché on Spanish forces stationed on Moroccan territory are as follows: Melilla area, but on Moroccan side of enclave border - 6,000; Villa Sanjurjo - 3,000; Ceuta area, but on Moroccan side of enclave border - 3,500; Tetuan - 9,000; Larache - 3,000; Villa Bens - 1,500; other areas - 1,000. Total - 22,000.)

It is reliably reported that these forces are gradually being reduced and many small garrisons are being eliminated and the troops withdrawn to Ceuta and Melilla. In addition, the number of Spanish troops in Spanish territories adjacent to Morocco are approximately as follows: Melilla - 16,000; Ceuta - 7,500; Ifni - 7,000; Spanish Sahara - 7,000.) 23.0

General Flavor of Spanish-Moroccan Relations

a. According to Benyelun. Benyelun said that while it was good that Spain had finally returned the Southern Protectorate, it ought to have done so almost two years ago when the Northern Protectorate was returned. Reminded that the Spanish Government has said that Morocco did not request the return of the Southern Protectorate until October 1957, Benyelun said he would show the reporting officer some time a copy of a letter which Mr. Balafrej had written to the Spanish Foreign Minister in August or September 1957, requesting the return of the Southern Protectorate and referring to similar requests made much earlier. Asked, why, if this were true, he thought Spain had held onto the territory for so long, he said he thought Spain had hoped to convince the US that it must keep the territory in the interests of Western security, but had failed to do so.

He said that if Spain had given up the territory much earlier as it should have done, Morocco would probably by now have signed a military pact with Spain, as the Spanish Government had proposed during the visit to Madrid of King Mohamed V in April 1956. He said Morocco for a time considered such a pact very seriously for Morocco needs the help of a more advanced country such as Spain in furnishing modern arms and training to Moroccan troops. Spain's nearby geographic position, and many past ties between the two countries, made Spain the most logical choice for such a partnership. Much valuable time had been lost, however, by Spain's attitude towards the questions of Ifni and the Southern Protectorate, and in fact such a pact might no longer be possible.

He said there was astonishingly little understanding in Spain for modern Morocco. Franco, for instance, had been in Morocco for many years, but he still thought of Morocco as it was 30 years ago -- a colony that could be dominated and ordered around. He cited as an example of Franco's attitude, the important interview given by him and published in the Spanish press on December 16, 1955, regarding the Moroccan situation (see Embassy Despatch 615 of December 19, 1955). Benyelun claimed that this was typical of high Spanish officials, and said he could count on the fingers of one hand the Spanish Government authorities

who had any reasonably good knowledge of Moroccan languages, and that he knew of none who had a full command of both the spoken and written styles of Moroccan Arabic, to say nothing of Berber or local dialects. He asserted that General Diaz Villegas, Director of Plazas y Provincias Africanas, and for many years now one of Franco's closest advisers on Moroccan and African affairs, cannot speak any Moroccan language well. How can anyone, without a command of a country's language, really know and understand the people of that country, Benyelun asked, adding that many ^{only Spanish} Spaniards knew and understood the Spanish far better than ~~they~~ knew or understood the Moroccans.

This failure to know and understand modern Morocco led the Spanish Government to make many serious errors of judgment in dealing with Morocco, which in turn tended more and more to alienate Moroccan public opinion towards Spain. For example, Benyelun said, during the recent period of strain caused by the fighting in Ifni and Spanish Sahara, Moroccans in Spain were repeatedly badgered by Spanish police and other authorities requiring them to report frequently to police stations, obtain special identity papers, etc. The handful of Moroccan businessmen in Madrid and the 100 or so Moroccan students in Spain had been so annoyed that the Moroccan Embassy had threatened the Spanish Foreign Office that it would send them all back to Morocco if these annoyances did not stop. Benyelun said the Embassy, too, was pestered in many ways, and his telephone and that of his Ambassador were tapped by the Spanish police. (He did not explain how he knew this.) Word of such things inevitably reached the Moroccan public, as had those difficulties put in the way of Moroccan troops sent to take over the Protectorate recently, and the growing impression resulted that there was fundamentally bad faith on Spain's part towards Morocco. The reaction in Morocco was not in the long term interest of Spain.

Benyelun said he was very familiar with what he regarded as a common trait of duplicity in the Spanish character. Owing to the prevalence of that characteristic, he said, his Government dealt only with the Spanish Embassy in Rabat in regard to the recent difficulties raised by the Spanish concerning the turnover of the Southern Protectorate, and did not instruct the Moroccan Embassy in Madrid to make parallel approaches to the Spanish Foreign Office in order to avoid the likelihood that the Spanish Government might attempt to confuse and delay matters further by giving one answer in Madrid and another in Rabat.

b. According to Ibáñez. Ibáñez said he had learned by experience that Moroccans in general were not very reliable, and dealings with them were almost invariably prolonged and tortuous. Having negotiated several treaties with high officials in Morocco, he found that they disguised their true aims as long as possible and were hard and tedious bargainers, like merchants in Moroccan bazaars. It was also normal for them not to be truthful, he said, and this explained in part the allegations recently made by Moroccan leaders of abductions by Spanish forces of Moroccan women and children in the Protectorate, stories of wells being filled in to deprive Moroccan troops of water, etc. He observed that Mr. Balafrej was a much more honorable and trustworthy gentleman than most Moroccan officials he had experience with, but he said apparently Balafrej had been swayed somewhat recently by his desire to be the next Prime Minister. He hinted that the Spanish Foreign Office would like to see Balafrej become Prime Minister. (Benjamin Welles of the New York Times told the reporting officer he thought the Spanish Government gave up the Protectorate when it did in an effort to help Balafrej, a moderate trusted by Spain, to become Prime Minister.)

Asked if any Spanish Government authorities understood Moroccan languages thoroughly, Ibáñez said yes, and named some. He referred especially to scientists and scholars who have made all sorts of surveys throughout Morocco, requiring long residence among the people and thus acquiring the language. His version regarding the treatment of Moroccans in Spain recently was that when the fighting started in Ifni, the Spanish authorities in Spain suddenly found that they had no idea how many Moroccans there were in Spain. Many Moroccans had never obtained proper identification papers, or registered with the police. The authorities therefore made efforts to find out who and where these Moroccans were, and required them to report and to get papers. Some Moroccans presented remarkable stories about why they were in Spain, such as one who claimed that he was studying veterinary science at Zaragoza University where there is no veterinary school!

Attitudes Towards Probable Future Territorial Questions - Ifni, Ceuta and Melilla, and Regions South of 27-40.

a. According to Benyelun. Benyelun has said several times that of course Morocco will insist on the return of Ifni, and at the appropriate time will also demand the return of Ceuta and Melilla and the other Spanish enclaves on the North coast of Morocco (Peñon, Alhucemas and the Chaffarinas Islands). Benyelun said that the only concession Morocco might be willing

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Page 7 of
Encl. No.
Desp. No. 748
From Madrid

to make in regard to the North Moroccan enclaves was in regard to the time when they must be returned. Morocco might be willing, in return for certain concessions by the Spanish, to agree to put off the actual turnover for 10-15 years. In regard to southern territories, Benyelun ridiculed Spanish assertions that 27-40 was the permanent boundary of Morocco and Spanish Sahara. He said he would show the reporting officer soon a map of the Sahara upon which a Moroccan official who was in Spain recently drew tentatively the borders Morocco will eventually claim in the South. He said it was similar to a chart the Moroccan Government was now preparing for presentation to "the proper people at the proper time". He intimated that the areas to be claimed were considerable, and impinged both upon French and Spanish territory.

b. According to Ibáñez. Ibáñez made clear that with the return of the Southern Protectorate, Spain has given up all the territory it intends to let go to Morocco, although in the case of Ifni, he said that, speaking personally, he did not think it would remain a difficulty in the way of Spanish-Moroccan understanding if Morocco were reasonable about other matters, thus hinting strongly that, in certain circumstances, Spain might be willing to give up its rights in Ifni, also. He indicated that in regard to all other territories, and perhaps Ifni, Spain would, if pressed for further cessions, be prepared to stand on its legal rights as clearly established in treaties and perhaps submit any demands to international arbitration. He said he also expected that Morocco would not want to argue such claims on a legal basis, but would strive to make political issues of them by local action and/or in the United Nations, counting upon current anti-colonial sympathies in many countries rather than "legal technicalities" to work to the advantage of Moroccan interests.

Regarding the enclaves on the North Moroccan coast, Ibáñez said that because Spain's treaty rights to these go back long before Protectorate days and they have always been administered separately from the Northern Protectorate, no mention was made of them in the agreement signed by Spain with Morocco on April 7, 1956, which provided for the return of the Northern Protectorate. As examples of the early treaties that apply to these places, Ibáñez cited the Treaty of Meknes of March 1, 1799, articles 14 and 15 (the last of which, regarding Ceuta, refers also to an earlier treaty of 1782); and the O'Donnell-El Abbas Treaty of March 25, 1860, articles 2 and 3. He stressed that when these treaties were signed, Morocco was an independent Empire.

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In the case of Ifni, Ibáñez cited the text of the Treaty of Tetuan of April 26, 1860, Article 8, which reads as follows:

"Artículo 8 - S. M. Marroqui se obliga a conceder a perpetuidad a S. M. Católica en la costa del Océano junto a Santa Cruz la Pequeña, el territorio suficiente para la formación de un establecimiento de pesquería como el que España tuvo allí antiguamente."

He claimed that the Spanish text clearly shows that the territory is what was ceded and not the fishing installation. Furthermore, he said that the territory was ceded for strategic purposes, and the phrase about fishing was only inserted at the Sultan's request to help to protect him from humiliation among his subjects because he was ceding territory to the "infidel". Ibáñez said that unfortunately Spain was not represented in the preparation of this treaty by skilled negotiators, and as a result the wording of the treaty was not as precise as it should have been. The Sultan for his part was not so concerned ^{in 1860} about the Ifni area as he was that Spain's next claim might be for the far richer and more important territory around Agadir.

Regarding territories in the Sahara, Ibáñez said the fact was that Morocco had always ended at the Draa and the authority of the Sultan never extended South of that river, except perhaps for brief periods of conquest. On a similar basis, he said, Spain could still claim Southern Italy, all of South America except Brazil, and large portions of the US. The Sultan had often admitted in the past that he did not control the area South of the Draa, as is illustrated for example in Article 18 of the Marrakesh Treaty of May 28, 1767, in which it is stated:

"Artículo 18 - S. M. I. se aparta de deliberar sobre el establecimiento que S. M. C. quiere fundar al sur del río Nun, pues no puede hacerse responsable de los accidentes o desgracias que sucedieran a causa de no llegar allí sus dominios y ser la gente que habita el país errante y feroz, que siempre ha ofendido y aprisionado a los canarios."

Ibáñez also referred in this connection to information contained in Julio Caro Baroja's book, Estudios Saharianos, published in Madrid in 1955 by the Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas. This is the best book the reporting officer has seen on the location, history, customs, etc., of the tribes now being frequently mentioned in regard to Morocco's southern territorial claims, including those mentioned by King

* Name used on Spanish maps for the lower Draa.

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Page 9 of

Encl. No. 748

Desp. No. Madrid

From _____

Mohamed V in his recent M'Hamid speech (e.g. the Ergeibat, Tekna, Ulad Delim and Singet - Spanish spelling of tribes mentioned in Embassy Rabat's telegram 889 to Department of February 27, 1958). Ibáñez's source for treaty texts, incidentally, was Isidro de las Cagigas' volume, Tratados y Convenios Referentes a Marruecos, published by the Instituto de Estudios Africanos, Madrid, 1952.

Ibáñez said that the 27-40 boundary of the former Southern Protectorate was accepted by Morocco when the Moroccan Government agreed in its treaty of May 20, 1956, with France, to accept all acts and agreements signed by France in the name of Morocco during the Protectorate period (excepting only the US bases agreement). The Treaty of November 27, 1912, between France and Spain was thus accepted by Morocco and Article 2 of this Treaty specifically denoted 27-40 as the Protectorate boundary (which was first established by the secret Franco-Spanish Treaty of October 3, 1904). Turning the matter around the other way, Ibáñez said Morocco could present no legal claim to the territory of the Southern Protectorate unless it recognized the Treaty of 1912, because no other treaty except the secret agreement of 1904 mentioned the Southern Protectorate and the 27-40 boundary. All previous agreements made clear that Morocco ended at the Draa.

Conclusion

An attempt has been made to present the above conflicting viewpoints objectively, as illustrations of the sort of problems and difficulties that seem to lie ahead. Obviously there is not a little touchiness and hard feeling on both sides which will make the problems themselves harder to solve. It is a temptation to try to evaluate the two sources on the basis of honorableness and sincerity, but it would probably be better not to do so. Suffice it to say, that the Spanish Government evidently realizes that it is on the defensive in Africa, due to the nature of the times more than anything else. Spain may well put up a hard struggle to retain what is still left of its territory, with all that that implies, especially if Morocco pushes ahead too hard and too fast. Given time, however, a settlement much more in the real interests of Spain and Morocco may be possible, perhaps something along the lines of military and economic pacts between European and North African states such as Premier Gaillard recently mentioned. But that will require much more restraint and understanding between Morocco and Spain than has been evidenced recently.

For the Ambassador:

Richard H. Hawkins, Jr.
Richard H. Hawkins, Jr.
Counselor of Embassy

Dept pls pass copies to: Paris, Rabat

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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : AmEmbassy Madrid

750

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

APRIL

June 16, 1958

DATA

~~REF~~ .Embassy Telegrams 1086, April 3, and 1113, April 9.

APRIL

June 1

~~REF~~ Embassy Telegrams 1086, April 3, and 1113, April 9

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SUBJECT: Press Reaction to Cession of the Southern Protectorate 950

Paris-1 Rabat-1 JCB-1

, while

Although the announced turnover of the former Southern Protectorate of Morocco originally received quite dignified treatment in the Madrid press during the period April 3 to April 10, following the Moroccan charges on April 11 that Spain had blocked the take-over all papers have again taken up journalistic cudgels in defense of Spanish action in West Africa.

(1) The news release of the Sintra Agreement was carried in identical words in all Madrid papers on April 3, with no further comment being voiced at that time by any of the dailies. A free translation of the Spanish article is attached. Nothing more was mentioned on the subject until April 6, when most papers printed a small statement stating that "disinterest, faith, and dignity" characterized the Spanish attitude toward North and West Africa, and emphasizing that Parallel 27-40, cited in the Treaty of 1912, constituted quite clearly the southern limit of the old Protectorate and therefore marked the definitive border between Spanish Sahara and the Kingdom of Morocco.

Silence again prevailed until the day of the turn-over, when several newspapers pointed with pride to the fact that seven Paris publications, together with at least one British and one Portugese paper, had commented with satisfaction upon Spain's complete fulfillment of her international obligations. On April 10 both Arriba and ABC patted themselves on the back in a discussion of the final solution which so thoroughly indicated that Spain had honored its commitments once again, particularly when it was taken into consideration that the "Southern Protectorate" was a French invention and that actually Morocco did not, and never had had, any justified claim upon the region. Emphasis was also laid upon the "fact" that the 27-40 line, even though an imaginary border, most definitely represented the boundary between Spanish Sahara and Morocco, and the sincere hope was expressed that a happier era of Hispano-Moroccan

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relations would now develop. Editorials in Madrid and Informaciones the same evening made approximately the same points, and it is probable that other, less prominent late dailies did likewise.

On Saturday, April 12, Arriba and ABC exploded in exasperation with Rabat when it was first announced that Moroccan troops had been denied the right of passage across Spanish territory south of 27-40 on their way to occupy Tarfaya. Editorials, undoubtedly based on information from the Spanish Foreign Ministry, pointed out in no uncertain terms that King Mohamed V had no right to expect that his troops could cross Spanish territory without prior authorization and that no such permission had ever been requested by the Moroccans. Mr. Balafrej's statement in Rabat on the previous day was given a prominent position in both papers, and the naivete of his comment that the road taken by the Royal Army was the shortest into Tarfaya and that "a road has no frontiers" was ridiculed by the editorialists, who declared that this was simply another piece of evidence that the Moroccan Government knew nothing of its new province. With respect to the remaining three charges leveled at Spain by Balafrej to the effect that the Spanish had surrounded Villa Bens with barbed wire, had sealed up the only wells outside the fortifications, and had deported the new Moroccan Governor's family to El Aiun, Arriba and ABC replied quite logically to the first two. Indicating that Villa Bens, as the site of the Spanish garrison, was a military base, Arriba sarcastically inquired if such a base should be surrounded by flowers instead of wire, while ABC pointed out that wiring the installation was "characteristic of many military posts in a state of alarm". So far as sealing the wells was concerned, both papers declared that wells in the area had long ago been found to be unusable and that the Spanish forces in the area had for some time been importing some of their water from the Canary Islands and supplementing this source by distilling sea-water with portable machines. Responsibility for Moroccan lack of intelligence on this score was completely denied. As for the Governor's family, no refutation of the charge was made, and Arriba confined itself to saying that a man of the Governor's caliber should never have been appointed to the position, since he had enriched himself at Spain's expense and then turned on her as one of the instigators of the attacks upon Ifni.


The validity of Spain's action in prohibiting Moroccan transit of Spanish Sahara, as well as criticism of the Moroccan accusations, was given smug prominence in Sunday morning's papers with the printing of further excerpts from the foreign press.

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Page 3 of
Encl. No. _____
Desp. No. 750
From Madrid

ABC, moreover, charged for the first time that the Moroccan negotiators at the Sintra Conference had refused to recognize the 27-40 line as representing the Southern frontier of the Kingdom, although the Treaty of 1912 which Rabat had cited as the basis for claiming the Southern Protectorate specifically used that parallel as the Southern border of the ceded region. This same idea was expressed again on April 14 in an editorial carried in Informaciones. Further comment appears to be withheld pending new developments.

For the Ambassador:


Richard H. Hawkins, Jr.
Counselor of Embassy

Department please pass copies to: Paris
Rabat

Enclosure: Translation of Press Report in Madrid of Sintra Accord *copy*

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FREE TRANSLATION OF PRESS REPORT IN MADRID OF SINTRA ACCORD

As agreed during discussions held on April 1 in the Portugese site of Sintra between the Foreign Ministers of Spain and Morocco, Sr. Castiella and M. Balafrej, on the coming 10th of April Moroccan authorities will assume jurisdiction of the Southern Zone of the former Spanish Protectorate of Morocco.

It is understood that as well as the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the Moroccan Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, M. Boucette, the Spanish Ambassador in Rabat, Don Felipe de Alcover, and the Moroccan Ambassador in Madrid, Mr. Awad, participated in the indicated discussions; all arrived in Lisbon by air.

The Zone to be transferred is delimited according to the Treaty of November 27, 1912; to the North by the River Draa; to the East by the 11th Meridian; and to the South by Parallel 27-40.

Spanish Armed Forces will continue to be stationed in the Zone under the same regulations as those in the remainder of Morocco until the signing of a definitive agreement regarding all troops.

Spain has a garrison of some 1,500 men, concentrated most recently in Villa Bens or Cabo Juby. The natives refer to this locality as Tarfaya.

According to diplomatic circles this decision by the Spanish Government, which has put an end to a period of tension, represents a serious contribution toward the easing of the situation in a region as effervescent as that of North Africa.

The French and Spanish military operations in the Sahara, which dealt such a grave blow to the Army of Liberation, will now permit the Royal Army to guarantee order in those territories that are now to be reintegrated under the authority of the Government of Rabat.

On the Spanish side, it is emphasized that with this gesture the Spanish Government has totally complied with its promise "to respect the territorial integrity of the King of Morocco, as guaranteed by the international treaties in force" (and) according to the text of the joint Spanish-Moroccan declaration signed in Madrid on April 7, 1956 in which the independence of Morocco was recognized".

No document designed to become public was signed at the meeting.

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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Control: 11977

Rec'd: April 18, 1958
3:04 p.m.

FROM: Rabat

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1159, April 18, 6 p.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 1159; REPEATED INFORMATION MADRID 122, PARIS,
CASABLANCA, TANGIER UNNUMBERED.

1. Following account comes from correspondent for American news agency who accompanied party correspondents flown by GOM to Terfaya (Cape Juby) yesterday morning:

Group landed on air strip and were received politely but formally by Spanish captain. Air strip, port and town are all enclosed within barbed wire and constitute Spanish military post. Correspondents had no time to examine town but were taken immediately to exit from barbed wire and directed to nearby douar (Moroccan hut village) alongside which RMA unit of about company strength under command Major Oufkir, King's aid de-camp, is encamped. Unit reached Terfaya in convoy six trucks bringing own water and supplies. Spaniards allow no armed Moroccans within enclosed area and correspondents found only two Moroccans there, RMA liaison officer (side arms removed) and Khattib of Foreign Office.

2. In conversation with Laraki of Foreign Office yesterday, Counselor took line suggested by DEPTEL 1091. Laraki asserted GOM exercising restraint but he was sharply critical of Spanish behavior. Laraki stated GOM had been unable obtain from either Spanish Embassy Rabat or Spanish Foreign Office explanation for actions Spanish authorities in Terfaya. He was noncommittal on whether or not GOM is now (repeat now) insisting on evacuation Spanish forces from Terfaya.

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PARIS' 4892, RABAT's 1197

Assume CNO message 251821Z April to ALUSNA Rabat RPTD ALUSNA Paris
and ALUSNA Rabat message 271630Z April to USCINCNELM RPTD ALUSNA Paris
* constitute full response French representations reported REFTEL.

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Drafted by:

EUR:RA:PFDuVivier:met April 30, 1958

Telegraphic transmission and
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Alexander Schnee

Clearances:

Navy - Capt. Sieglaff

AF/N - Mr. Norland
WE - Mr. Beigel

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58-52
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Control: 15965
Rec'd: April 24, 1958
8:17 p.m.

AF FROM: Rabat
Info TO: Secretary of State
RMR NO: 1184, April 24, 6 p.m.

SS

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SP SENT DEPARTMENT 1184, REPEATED INFORMATION MADRID 123,
C-1 PARIS 444, ALGIERS, DAKAR, TANGIER, CASABLANCA UNNUMBERED.

C-2

L Balafrey tells me Spanish military in southern zone behaving
IO very correctly. No serious incidents and only few minor
INR irritations. I found way to mention personality new Governor
H Bou Aida as perhaps not happy choice. He said GOM hard put
EUR to it to find anyone familiar with area and hopes it will
P work out.

UOP

IRC On removal Spanish troops which number 40,000 in all Morocco
OCB he said Spanish have not replied to note and next week after
CIA formation new government GOM will discuss matter in Ministerial
OSD Council. He declares position GOM juridically sound being
ARMY based on paragraph 3 of protocol annexed to Spanish-Moroccan
NAVY declaration of April 7, 1956, which provided for presence
AIR Spanish troops through transition period which now ended by
return of territories and assumption full administrative and
security authority by organs of GOM.

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Control: 15513.

Rec'd: April 24, 1958
10:03 A.M.

15513
APR 24 1958
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OFFICE OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
MESSAGE CENTER
RM/R

FROM: Paris
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 4892, April 24, 1 p.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 4892, REPEATED INFORMATION RABAT 309, USAREUR HEIDELBERG UNNUMBERED.

Naval Attaché has received communication from French Navy complaining that United States Navy failed to inform French in advance of hydrographic survey it is conducting along Moroccan coast. Communication claims that by virtue of paragraph 3 of protocol to Moroccan Declaration Independence dated March 2, 1956, French Navy remains invested pending establishment of Moroccan Navy, with all tasks assumed prior that date, among which were coastal hydrographic surveys.

Communication also states French Navy has been forwarding results of this hydrographic work along Moroccan coast since 1950 to United States Navy Hydrographic Office and requests that reciprocal steps be taken by United States Navy.

No record here of United States hydrographic survey mentioned by French. Naval Attaché has queried CNO for confirmation, reason for survey and whether resultant data can be provided French.

Would hope that naval attaché can be supplied information promptly so that matter can be handled expeditiously through naval channels.

Meanwhile, Embassy would welcome any comments from Department or Rabat.

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Action
EUR Info RMR
INR AF IRC

FROM: CNO
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 251821Z, April (Navy Message)

Control: 16737
Rec'd: April 25, 1958
5:40 p.m.

SENT ALUSNA RABAT, REPEATED INFORMATION CINCNELM, ALUSNA PARIS, FRANCE, HYDRO, STATE.

QUOTE

ALUSNA Paris, France 211330Z PASEP

Request comment. Paragraph 8 my letter serial 00750P31 of 12 December 1957 refers.

FOR ALUSNA PARIS. Hydro data will be made available to French Navy in accordance with established exchange program.

UNQUOTE

OM/2

771-022/4-2558

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MAY 23 1958
FILED

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771-02274-2658

57-52

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CIA
OSD
NAVY

Control: 17224
Rec'd: April 26, 1958
12:25 p.m.

15
WS copy

FROM: Rabat
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 1197, April 26, 9 a.m.

SENT PARIS 449; REPEATED INFORMATION DEPARTMENT 1197.

Paris telegram 4892 to Department information Rabat 309.

Hydrographic survey has been underway since November 1957 and conducted in two stages. First stage occurred last fall located points from which computations made and second stage measurements taken. Expect that second stage will be completed in about two weeks.

Conduct of survey has been with coordination and cooperation of GOM. French officials in Morocco are aware of survey and have manifested curiosity as to real purpose of survey because they consider it entirely unnecessary due to accurate status of French measurements. In attempt keep measurements current French presently attempting to initiate new hydrographic survey which has required assistance from French Embassy to get underway.

Embassy has no comments re reasons for our survey or re forwarding its results to French. This can best be answered by Washington. It is pertinent to note that GOM has also requested copy of results.

SWD:LAS/4

CANNON

MAY 12 1958



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Control: 18501
Rec'd: APRIL 29, 1958
7:25 AM

FROM: ALUSNA RABAT
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 271630Z APRIL (NAVY MESSAGE)

PRIORITY

SENT CINCNELM, CNO REPEATED INFORMATION ALUSNA PARIS, COMUSTHFLT,
NPO LONDON, COMNAVACTS PT LYAUTHEY, HYDRO WASHINGTON AND
SECSTATE.

REFER ALUSNA PARIS CONF LTR SER 020 DTD 1 APR 1958.

SUBJECT, HYDRO OPERATIONS MOROCCAN WATERS.

IN JANUARY NA RABAT PERSONALLY DISCUSSED WITH ADMIRAL ANTOINE COMMANDER FRENCH NAVAL FORCES MOROCCO AND HIS CHIEF STAFF OFFICER PROPOSED HYDRO OPERATIONS INCLUDING SHORE ACTIVITIES AS WELL AS SHIP ALL WITHIN SECURITY LIMITATIONS IMPOSED BY THE IMPLEMENTING DIRECTIVE (CNO SECRET LTR SER 00750P31 DTD 12 DEC 1957 NOTAL). SUPPLEMENTARY TALKS WERE AGAIN HELD WITH ADMIRALTY PRELIMINARY TO UNITS OF TG 48.5 VISIT CASABLANCA.

HAVE THIS DATE DISCUSSED ENCL 1 TO NA PARIS LTR CITED ABOVE PERSONALLY WITH ADM ANTOINE IN CASABLANCA. HE TOLD ME THAT AS FOR OUR INITIAL TALKS HE HAD NOTIFIED HIS NAVY GENERAL STAFF PARIS, HAD APPRECIATED THE LIAISON AND HAD CONSIDERED THE OPERATION AS ROUTINE RESULTS OF WHICH WOULD BE HANDLED ON A "HYDRO TO HYDRO" BASIS.

ADM ANTOINE INDICATED THE FOLLOWING STEPS WOULD BE TAKEN IMMEDIATELY.

A. HE WOULD SEND A LETTER TO GEN STAFF FRENCH NAVY EXPLAINING THAT NA RABAT HAD PROVIDED NOTICE OF IMPENDING HYDRO OPERATIONS AND WOULD CITE TO THEM AGAIN HIS MESSAGES ON THIS SUBJECT. NA RABAT TO RECEIVE INFORMAL COPY OF THIS COMMUNICATION.

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771-022/4-2758

CONFIDENTIAL

-2- 271630Z APRIL (NAVY MESSAGE) FROM ALUSNA RABAT

B. ADM ANTIONE STATED FURTHER HE WILL WRITE PERSONAL LTR TO CAPITAINE M. A. NOEL HIS FORMER COFS, NOW ASST TO CHIEFE 3RD BUREAU PARIS. NOEL WHO IS FULLY ACQUAINTED ALL DETAILS AND WILL BE ASKED TO STRAIGHTEN MATTER OUT IN PARIS. REGRET DELAY FORWARDING THIS INFO DETAILS OF WHICH KNOWN PERSONALLY TO THIS ATTACHE WHO WAS ON LEAVE UNTIL 26 APRIL.

HLH

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

43

~~SECRET~~

Action

Control: 19575

AF

FROM: Rabat

Rec'd: April 30, 1958

Info

2:52 p.m.

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

1-15

L

NO: 1212, April 30, 10 a.m.

INR

EUR

IRC

SENT PARIS 453, REPEATED INFORMATION DEPARTMENT 1212.

CIA

Re EMBTEL 449 repeated Department 1197.

OSD

NAVY

Naval Attaché just returned from leave informs that Admiral Antoine, Commander French Naval Forces Morocco, was fully briefed on US hydrographic survey in January 1958. Details set forth in Naval Attaché message 271630Z to Paris.

CANNON


LMS: INK/5

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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : Amembassy RABAT

377
DESP. NO.

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

DO NOT TYPE IN THIS SPACE

79100/6-1358
XR 871.25
871.00June 13, 1958
DATE

REF : CERP, Morocco, General Interest.

15	ACTW P-3	DEPT.	E-4 ICA-10
For Dept.	IRC/P-1	R M/R-2 IRC-8 GE-1 AF-5 I 0-4 EUR-5 P-5	ARMY-4 NAVY-3 AIR-3 OSD-4
Use Only	REC'D	F OTHER 6/25 O CIA-12 IN-7 USIA-10 COM-10 AG-8 TAR-2	

SUBJECT: Economic Map of Morocco, 1958.

This Document must be Returned
to the RM/R Central Files.

① Transmitted with this despatch are four copies of the map Carte Economique 1958 of Morocco published by l'Institut Geographique National (Annexe du Maroc) at Rabat. This map is the first one on which the new names, which were changed in order to bring them into conformity with national usage, appear (Embassy Despatch 257 of February 28, 1958). In most cases, the old name appears in small type below the new name. The map is interesting because it is the first one which is readily available on which appear the locations of the various known mineral deposits in the country.

Also of geographic and economic interest is the recently published Atlas du Maroc published by the Comite de Geographie du Maroc, a section of l'Institut Scientifique Cherifien. This atlas is really a folder containing a number of single sheet maps, most of them 1:1,000,000. The maps included are: forests (four sheets), distribution of diseases, railways, merchandise traffic of railways and animal husbandry (three sheets covering the following subjects: Sheep and goats; cattle, pigs, camels and horses; and distribution of animal markets and veterinary facilities). Also included are six booklets explaining the maps and an explanation of the system of transliteration of Arabic into French. If the Department or other agencies in Washington are interested in this atlas, the Embassy will be glad to procure it. The cost is 8,000 francs (about \$18 at the present unofficial rate of exchange).

771-022/6-1358

HBS

For the Ambassador:

Alfred T. Wellborn
Counselor of Embassy

Enc. St

MAIL DESK

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FOR INFORMATION REPORTING
AUG 12 1958
L S Murphy
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AIR POUCH

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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : AMCONGEN, Dakar, F.W.A.

305
DESP. NO.

771.022/62658

Argygas

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

June 26, 1958

REF : Consulate General's Telegrams #90 of February 28, 1958 and # 83 of
February 18, 1958

DATE
771.022



9 For Dept. Use Only	ACTION	DEPT.
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REC'D	F OTHER	
7-2-58 CIA-121 PARIS-1 MADRID-1 RABAT-1 ABIDJAN-1		

SUBJECT: Reasons underlying the Official Blackout of Information in Dakar during the recent Franco-Spanish Military Operations in Mauritania-Rio de Oro

Just prior to departing for four months' leave in France, the Managing Editor of the local daily newspaper, Paris-Dakar, Mr. Daniel de Bergevin, went out of his way with a "now it can be told" approach to the reporting officer, and divested himself of the following information regarding the Franco-Spanish military operations which took place during February and March 1958.

During the early part of the month of February 1958, shortly after the Franco-Spanish military campaign against the Moroccan Army of Liberation and dissident Regueibat tribesmen in Mauritania-Rio de Oro was under way, de Bergevin was summoned to the office of the then Acting High Commissioner, Governor Jean Risterucci, Inspector General of Administrative Affairs, in the temporary absence of both High Commissioner Gaston Cusin and Secretary General Xavier Torre. Risterucci, after first telling de Bergevin that he knew that the latter and his wife were on very friendly terms with the reporting officer and his wife (as were he, Risterucci, and his wife), for that very reason he wanted to enjoin de Bergevin to refrain from passing on any pertinent information to the reporting officer, whether elicited or not, concerning the French military operations then progressing in Mauritania-Rio de Oro in conjunction with the Spanish armed forces.

Lt. General Gabriel Bourgund, C-in-C of all operations in this theater, and his deputy, Rear Admiral Yves Caron, both being on unusually good terms themselves with de Bergevin and the violently anti-American local journalist, Maurice Voisin Director-Owner-Editor in Chief of Echos d'Afrique Noire (because of the latter's ardent support of the French Armed Forces), they had divulged much important and valuable military information in this connection, but had sworn the two newspapermen to secrecy, which they adhered to closely. According to de Bergevin, whose reliability in imparting information has been unquestioned in the past, all general officers, chiefs of staff of the three services, land, air, and sea, the deputy chiefs of staff G-2 and G-3, the liaison officer interarms, the chief of combined land and air operations, the director of ~~Congress~~ military cabinet of the High Commissioner, the local military representative of the Ministry of National Defense in Paris, all of whom were on more or less easy speaking terms with the reporting officer, had been ordered by General Bourgund, personally, as well as the COs of the three principal regiments garrisoned in or around Dakar, to politely but firmly give the reporting officer and everyone else connected with the Americ

Consulate the brush-off

JWE
JWEEdwards:jrc

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771.022/6-2658

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Page 2 of
Desp. No. 305
From Dakar, F.W.A.

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
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Encl. No. _____
Desp. No. _____
From _____

Consulate General the brush-off on the entire subject of the Mauritanian/Rio de Oro theater of operations. In case their interlocutors insisted too much, they were to be gotten rid of by being referred to the American Service Attaches in Paris with the statement that these attachés were informed of what was going on and were reporting to the Pentagon.

Apparently, as de Bergevin further stated, General Bourgund was determined that nothing of real interest should leak out to "the Americans" about this latest French military adventure in conjunction with the Spanish in North Africa. The reason advanced by the General for this complete blackout on military information was that he wanted no interference, which he feared, if the truth were to be known, from Washington or New York (UN), such as occurred at the time of the Suez fiasco, or any "good offices" deal as in the case of Tunisia. It seems that the mere thought of the possible appearance of the Sixth Fleet off the coast of Mauritania or Rio de Oro was enough to give Lt. General Bourgund (Army), Rear Admiral Caron (Navy) and Brig. General Robert Gaujour (Air), an advanced case of the jitters. General Bourgund, who was forever trying his best to play the whole campaign down so as to avoid attracting the attention of the United States or criticism from that quarter, was exceedingly annoyed by the Spanish military authorities who blew the whole affair up for days with bombastic and grossly exaggerated accounts of the fighting that was going on, for domestic as well as foreign consumption, chiefly for reasons of badly needed face saving and prestige.

COMMENT: It is not surprising, given the information revealed by de Bergevin to the reporting officer, that neither the latter nor anyone else on the staff of the Consulate General was able to glean much in the way of useful information during the months of February and March 1958 to report to the Department concerning this military activity in the Mauritania-Rio de Oro area, given the blackout provoked by the orders issued by the Commanding General of all French Armed Forces in French West Africa-Togo, with special applicability to American officials residing in Dakar.

The use of the classification NOFORN in this despatch has been made solely to protect the source, de Bergevin, who specifically requested that some kind of source protection of this nature be applied in this particular instance.


Donald Dumont
American Consul General

Department please send copies to Paris, Madrid, Rabat, USUN, and Abidjan

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JN'S

8478

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

To: The Secretary

September 19, 1958

Through: S/S 1P^U_n CH

From: DMR - Hugh S. Cumming, Jr. *WHL*

Subject: Intelligence Note: Possible Soviet Recognition of the Newly-announced Algerian "Government"

Moscow has not yet commented on the newly-formed Algerian government-in-exile nor has it given any other overt sign of its attitude toward this "government". There have been, however, two recent developments which, in our opinion, increase the likelihood of Soviet recognition.

First, there has been some recent evidence of hardening in the Soviet attitude toward the de Gaulle Government. Soviet press coverage of French events has become increasingly heavy with the approach of the referendum, and charges concerning de Gaulle's "personal dictatorship" have appeared widely in Soviet media. More important, the latest number of new bloc journal Problems of Peace and Socialism, printed a lead editorial (reprinted by Pravda) sharply critical of the de Gaulle Government. This authoritative statement, undoubtedly made at Moscow's orders, is designed to set the line for Communist parties in all bloc countries.

Second, Soviet comment prior to the opening of the 13th General Assembly stressed the importance of reaching a solution of the Algerian "war". (Gromyko did not mention the subject in his speech last year as he did this year.) The proper "solution", in terms of Moscow's public commitments, would be independence.

Finally, the presence of CPSU Presidium member Mukhittdinov in Cairo (he arrived September 17) may also be related in some way to the formation of the Algerian "government".

However, we do not conclude from the above developments that recognition is a foregone conclusion. Moscow is confronted with something of a dilemma in this matter. On the one hand, recognition would further the USSR's policy of courting Middle Eastern nationalism and would very likely earn it the approval not only of the Arab States but also of the whole neutralist belt. On the other hand, recognition could seriously strain Franco-Soviet relations, further weaken the already not very robust chances of the French Communist Party in the September 28 referendum, and put an end to hopes the USSR may have that the de Gaulle regime might prove receptive to Soviet overtures designed to exploit French nationalist feeling in order to create divisive pressures within NATO. In addition,

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the fact that the newly-announced Algerian regime claims it is at war with France must increase the violence with which the French Government and people would react to Soviet recognition.

In sum, the above developments have increased the chance of Soviet recognition of the new Algerian "government". However, this step, if it is taken, would probably not come until after most or all of the Arab countries had extended recognition.

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TELEGRAM**INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO**Department of State**

1958 SEP 26 PM 6 25

13382

Ref ID: A67890

SECRET**Classification**

SENT TO: AmEmbassy MADRID
Rptd Info: AmEmbassy RABAT
USUN

*269**400
351*

Origin

Info:

Spanish Charge under instructions informed Department orally GOS has Intelligence Reports Moroccan Army liberation building up for attack against Spanish forces IFNI defense perimeter. Spanish Ambassador Rabat has advised GOM Spain will hold it strictly accountable for any attack endangering peace and sovereignty Spanish territories.

GOS believes timing this military adventure connected with desire dramatize North African situation during UNGA.

Harter Acting*(Maj)**HERTER*

RM/R	
Anal	2
Rev	
Cat	

Drafted by:
EUR:WE:FHSacksteder:bb 9/26/58

Clearances:

AF/N - Mr. Bovey (in substance)

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

WE - Robert McBride

SECRET

S/C-CR

SEP 26 1958 P.M.

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Classification

Control: 17631

Rec'd: September 27, 1958
3:04 p.m.

FROM: Rabat

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 508, September 27, 5 p.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 508, REPEATED INFORMATION MADRID 12,
CASABLANCE, PARIS TANGIER UNNUMBERED.

DEPTEL 400 to Madrid information Rabat 351

Prior receipt foregoing we had asked Spanish Counselor here about wire service reports from Madrid of new difficulties Ifni. Counselor said there had been no incidents but Spanish military had reported reinforcement and movement AOL bands in Ifni area. Spanish Ambassador saw Balafrej night before last presumably to deliver warning mentioned Department's reference telegram although when I saw him earlier that day and inquired about Spanish areas to the south he had indicated nothing disturbing there.

If AOL intends break de facto truce, Spanish Counselor thought its main effort might be directed at Spanish Sahara and assumed in any case object would be to dramatize Moroccan territorial claims in south. He doubted that GOM intended raise these claims formally in UN at this time, being fully occupied with two problems of prior concern, Algeria and foreign military bases, notably those of US.

YOST

AAL:DWF-2

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JAS

NOV 3 - 1958

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Control: 2301

Rec'd: October 3, 1958
5:00 p.m.

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Action
AF

Info FROM: Rabat

RMR TO: Secretary of State

SS W NO: 548, October 3, 7 p.m.

G SP C L IO INR H EUR P UOP IRC OCB USIA CIA OSD ARMY NAVY AIR

SENT DEPARTMENT 548, REPEATED INFORMATION MADRID 15, PARIS 143.

During call on Spanish Ambassador today I asked whether there are any new difficulties in Ifni.

He replied that all is quiet, Spanish certainly have no desire to start anything and, despite rumors to the contrary, there is no evidence Moroccans intend to do so at this time.

Concerning Spanish forces in Morocco, he said these had already been reduced from 60,000 to about 20,000 (presumably excluding Ceuta and Melilla). He added that Spain had accepted "principle of evacuation" but that he is not disposed to work out exact timetable with GOM. His experience with Moroccan psychology leads him to believe agreement on timetable would not in fact reduce Moroccan pressure and that Moroccans are more likely to understand and respond to prolonged step-by-step haggling.

771-022/10-358

PA

YOST

MGG:DWF-2

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DEC 3 - 1958

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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : American Embassy, London

1105

DESP. NO.

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

REF : AF

November 10, 1958

DATE

E-7 HD-1 4/0-1 12 NOV 1958

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		RM/R-2 EUR-5 AF-5 IFC-8 IO-4 GE-1

SUBJECT:

Moroccan Claims to Mauretania and Algeria

AIR-1

The Department may be interested in the enclosed documents which have been issued by the Moroccan Embassy in London as supplements to its news bulletin of October, 1958.

The first document is a study of Morocco's claims to Mauretania and part of Algeria, the purpose being to assert the historical validity of these claims. The second document is a note from the permanent Secretariat of Mauretania and the Sahara in Rabat addressed to the president of the IBRD and dated October 10, 1958.

The Embassy assumes that the Department has received similar statements from the Embassy in Rabat in view of the long-standing discussion in Morocco of this problem. It may be significant however that the Moroccan Government is broadening its propaganda output on this problem at a time when developments in French West Africa are passing through a critical and fluid stage.

For the Ambassador:

Fred L. Hadsel
Fred L. Hadsel
First Secretary of Embassy

att.


Enclosures:

1. "Statements and Documents" No. 1
2. " " " " No. 2
(Unclassified)

cc: Rabat

771-022/11-1058

HBS



POL/N:FLHadsel:cem
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KINGDOM OF MOROCCO
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

ROYAL MOROCCAN EMBASSY
65 Ennismore Gardens, London, SW.7
PHONE: KNI.8827 Ext.4.


Enc. to des. 6105
from London

NEA

No.1.

STATEMENTS AND DOCUMENTS

OCTOBER 1958



MAURITANIA

From time eternal, up to the French occupation, the region of Chenguit now called Mauritania, has been a part of the complex Moroccan provinces. Since the Almoravides era (1053) to the beginning of the present century, its history, its religion, its political and social development always have evolved with the events happening to the Moroccan ensemble during that period.

This historic reality, which no one can deny, is the consequence of a geographical and ethnic reality. However, colonialists purposely ignored it when they conquered Morocco, particularly the region between Oued Draa and Senegal.

Now that the colonized peoples have become aware of their respective personalities and they claim liberty and self-determination, it is of even greater importance that certain historical facts be revealed: especially when these facts agree with the sincere desires of populations who cannot and who, above all, do not want to reject their past and their glorious ancestors.

Deceit and falsification of history must end.

Facts establish clearly that, before the French occupation, the geographical and ethnic boundaries of Morocco as a whole (Mauritania included) were also real political frontiers which determined a single and only State.

"The true function and originality of Morocco, in all respects, is that of link and passage-way between Mediterranean Europe and tropical Africa. To ignore what has come to Morocco through the Sahara, or the light of its power across the desert is to mutilate it and condemn oneself never to understand it". So spoke geographer J. Celerier at the VII Conference of the Moroccan Secondary Education Institute, in 1930 (Vol. XI d'Hesperis, etudes, notes et documents sur le Sahara occidental, 1930-1931, p.8).

In regard to the remarks of Vice-President Mokhtar Ould Daddah on the Almoravide conquest, it is hardly necessary to point out that the statement "Mauritania conquered Morocco" is a friendly joke, because there was no Mauritania during the Almoravide era, nor frontiers, nor Sultan-invested Hissane. The whole country was inhabited by Sanhadjas (Almoravides). If it is alleged that the French conquest abolished the rights of the Cherifian Sultan and of the Maq'il Arabs, then the XI-to-XV-century Arab conquest, by the same reasoning, abolished the rights of the former Almoravides.

The very idea of a Mauritania and its artificial frontiers being modern, historians and geographers cannot ask themselves: Is Mauritania part of the Maghreb or the es-Sudan Blad? The only question possible is: To what degree was it felt through the centuries that the territories recently incorporated to Mauritania belonged to the large North and South regions? The problem came up and was resolved by the most famous Moorish geographer, as stated below.

But first, the important thing is to understand the very nature of the political and psychological ties that may have existed between the inhabitants of "trab Chenguit" and those of the Cherifian Empire. To do so, one must forget current-day maps, all divided up by frontiers and covered with "polychromies" unknown to nature or life. A few remarks from the classic work of A.G.P. Martin, official interpreter in the French Army, will be helpful. The book is entitled "Quatre siecles d'histoire marocaine: au Sahara de 1504 a 1902, au Maroc de 1894 a 1912, d'apres archives et documentation indigenes", Paris, 1923, XVI + 591 p.

At the turn of the century, Moroccan Sahara was ruled by two caliphs: the Cherifian Lieutenant "for the Sahara" who resided at Tafilalet, and the caliph of Marrakech, which included the regions of Souss and Seguia-el-Hamra. The latter "also played the part of political link between the Maghreb Islamites and the Muslims from south-western Sahara, whose community of political life with the Cherifian Empire was not observed by Europeans" (p.368-369)..

With relation to the 1908 events, Martin writes: "Let us point out, for information purposes, that the Holy War had enrolled

Seguia-el-Hamra where the tribes corrupted the small Cherifian garrison Cap Juby, leaving its "caid" alone in his "kasba"; the Holy War spread as far as Tagant in southern Sahara where Moorish contingents, armed with rapid-fire guns, attacked French detachments on two or three occasions causing French losses. Only the French version of these incidents is known, and it is presented from a local "Mauritanian" point of view, without regard for their effect on... the whole Muslim political movement which no European, as yet, has documented sufficiently to give a true version on that region". (p.480-481).

On the French-Moroccan treaty of March 10, 1910 Martin points out "... the inconsistency between the intent of clause a) in Art.10, by which Saharans are to be considered as belonging beyond the frontier, and the inclusion of the said clause in the text just mentioned "for the chaoouia", which is an internal problem, when the French theme of the following chapter concerning the frontier includes Saharans". (p.523).

Let us consider the geographical problem brought up by Ahmed Ben Al Amin ech-chenguiti as to whether "Trab Chenguit" (consequently the major portion of Mauritania) is part of the Maghreb or of the Sudan. His famous work "Al-Wasit" (Cairo, 1911, 542 pp.) contains a chapter (p.410-411) devoted to the question. After recalling that Kamous-al-Mouhit establishes Chenguit within Maghreb al Aqqa (even within Maghreb Souss-al Aqqa) the author declares that "... the inhabitants of Chenguit and Morocco always have considered the country as being part of the Maghreb, contrary to the Oriental belief that Chenguit is a part of Sudan".^{1/}

The author then quotes a legal discussion which took place at Mecca in 1899-1900 between the Mufti of Medina who claimed that the Moors were Sudanese, and the Cadi Ibn Saouda who claimed they were Maghrebs. Supporting the latter opinion, the author quotes the work "Kitab al Baghiyat" by Sidi al-Arabi ben es-Saih; a manuscript by

^{1/} See page 10.

Sidi Mourtada ez-Zabidi relating the story of a Chenguit notable named Abd er-Rachid who had obtained an attestation of belonging to the Maghreb from the Sultan of Fes; and finally, an excerpt from the work "En-Noukhabat al-Azahriya" (p.323).

EXPEDITIONS AND INVESTITURES.

- 1) 1543-1544. Moroccan expedition to Oudan, of which Luis de Marmol y Caravajal appears to have been an eye-witness.
- 2) About 1584. Moroccan expedition toward Ouadam. (Es Sadi, Tarikh es-Soudan, French translation 1910, p.193; R. Mauny, 1949, p.129).
- 3) About 1584-1585. One caid and 200 soldiers are sent by Morocco to Taghazza. (Es Sadi, 1900, p.193-194; Le Chatelier's "L'Islam dans l'Afrique Occidentale", Paris, 1899, p.57, gives: 57).
- 4) 1590-1591. The Djouber expedition to Sudan. Tombouctou becomes Moroccan.
- 5) 1665-1666. Moroccan expedition to Mauritania. (fide Modat, bull. Com. Et. Hist. Scient. A.O.F. 1922, p.561, and Esquisse, "Adrar Mauritanien", ms. 1916, p.50, from Touer Jenne's chronicle). Modat mentions Tichit, La Chapelle (1931 p.81 1/4/ quotes Ouadan. 2/)
- 6) About 1672-1675. Moroccan troops sent to Trarza to support the Hassanes in their war against the Zwayas. In his "Nouvelle Relation" (III Paris, 17-28, p.87-88) Father Labat mentions the fact adding that the Moroccans, jobless after the Hassane victory, travelled to Senegal attacking the three Wolof principalities of Walo, Diolof, and Cayor. Also mentioned by Gillier, (1936, p.24) 3/, and by Marty, 1919, 4/.
- 7) 1672. Investiture of Hennoun, Emir of Oulda M'Barek, by Moulay Ismail. (Le Chatelier, 1899, p.59).
- 8) 1678-1679. Moroccan **expedition** headed by Moulay Ismail himself to Mauritania (possibly to Chenguit and Tichit). (Cf. Zayyani, Et-Tordjmat el Moarrib... transl. Houda "Le Maroc de 1631 à 1812"; p.31, quoted by La Chapelle, 1931, p.81, 2/; En-Nasiri es-Slawi, Kitab el Istiqsa... transl. Fumey "Archives Marocaines" IX, 1906, p.76-77: the author quotes the year 1089 (1676-1679), P. Marty p.69, quotes this year 1689 - a typographical error.)

2/, 3/, 4/, 2/. See page 10.

Was it during this trip that the Emir of Trarza Haddi, father of Ali Chandora, was invested? These investitures of Moorish chiefs by the Sultan of Morocco were frequent, and they are explained by Father Labat's remarks: "All those Moors (Trarzas, Aulad, el Hagi, Braknas) recognise the King of Morocco. They consider him as their "Cherif", although their veneration does not extend to paying taxes or to calling him their King, except when it serves their purpose. Their submission to the Prince does not exceed the limits of a civility purely political. And, inasmuch as they reside too far to fear Him, they live in independence among their herds which compose their wealth".

P. Larbarthe ("Voyage au Senegal", Paris, An X-1802, p.35) perhaps was copying Labat when he wrote of the Moors: "These tribes look upon the King of Morocco as their Cherif, but their great distance from the Prince assures the independence of these nomads".

- 9) 1680. Moroccan expedition to Tagant, headed by a nephew of Moulay Ismail. (Le Chatelier, 1899, p. 59; and La Chapelle, 1931, p.91 /47/).

- 10) Ali Chandora (1703-1727), involving:

- a) Ali Chandora's famous ~~voyage~~ to Meknes, accompanied by a learned "marabout" from Chenguit, Abdallah Mohammed, Abdallah ben Et-Taleb, b. Habab b. Abdidja. "The Sultan officially gave him the command of southern **Mauritania**, and, to dedicate the investiture, he gave him the sole right to ~~wear~~ white cotton trousers, inasmuch as the Moors all wore black guinea cotton trousers". (P. Marty, p.69. O. de Puigaudeau's "Le Grand voyage de l'Emir Ali Chandora R.T.P. Emissions Culturelles", 13 August, 1957. To be published: "Miroir de l'histoire", June, 1958).

The Ida-ou-Ali version of the relationship between Moulay Ismail and Ali Chandora (P. Marty, 1919, p.71-72) relates that the Emir's companion received 400 manuscripts from the Sultan. Who knows whether some of them may not be still ~~found~~ in the Chenguit libraries? (Bibli. Ah el Abbot, Laghal).

- b) The Moroccan troops made available to Ali Chandora to support his fight against the Oulad Rizg, etc. (R. Basset, "Mission au Senegal", I, 1913, p.490; P. Marty, 1919, p.70-71). They consisted of men supplied by the Teknas of Oued Noun and Ali Chandora (P. Marty, 1919, p.70-71).

"The Moorish tradition designates the current lougeidat groups as descendants of Ali Chandora's Moroccan warriors" (id.p.70). Gillier (p.278-279) mentions that Akchar, father of Ammoni, was a Moroccan from one of the makhzen troupes. J. Asensio (Hesperis, XI, 1931, p.30) specifies: "...one of the contingents headed by Akchar, who gives his name to the region where he resides; Akchar, descendant of the Ouled Immont and the Ouled Cheilan ...". Leriche (bull. Ifran XIV, 1952, No.1, p.338) recalls that said Akchar headed a Cherifian detachment in Mauritania.

Sultan Moulay Ismail married the daughter of a Maqil chief (of the Brakna branch, according to Cheikh Taleb Khiyar), Bekkar al Mghari (En Nasiri esslawi, 1906, p.76; La Chapelle, 1931, p.77: 43/. 4/).

La Chapelle continues (p.77-78 43-44/): "In their invasion of Mauritania and the Hoh, Arab forces were composed of regular Cherifian troops and official tax collectors, which evidently justifies the taxes they imposed on their Sanhadja neighbours. At any rate, it explains how the Saads considered their migration as a conquest to their credit; it explains why, through various eras, Moroccan sovereigns sent military expeditions throughout the desert, and why they could claim that the Moorish country belonged to their empire; it explains that Ahmed ech-Chinguitti, after consulting various doctors, annexed it to the Maghreb rather than to the Sudan; it explains why certain Mauritanian and Nigerian chiefs were indifferently invested at Fez or Marrakech; finally, it explains why Saharan Arabs, in perilous circumstances, naturally turned to Morocco."

- 11) About 1757-1759. Emir of Trarza Mokhtar o. Amaro. Ali Chandora receives a brass drum from Sultan Mohammed B. Abdallah b. Moulay Ismail. (P. Marty, 1919, p.79).
- 12) 1860. On the "3 rebia le second 1277", Sultan Moulay Mohamed b. Moulay Abder-Rahman writes to Cheikh Sidvia el Kebir: "... we acknowledge your recognition of Us as a legitimate Prince ..." (A. Leriche, bull. Ifran XIV, No.2, 1952, Arabic text, p.634, transl. p.632-633).
- 13) 1886. Sultan Moulay Hassan (1875-1894) travels personally to Tarfaya (Cape Juby) to establish a post and a small garrison. (En Nasiri es-Slawi, 1906, p.336-339). It seems inaccurate that the Sultan would have destroyed all traces of buildings erected by the English Cherifiens (Mackenzie and his North-West African Trading Company Ltd), because his successor, Moulay Abd el Aziz, had to pay £50,000 in 1895 for "the buildings which had been a factory" (T.G. Figueras, Santa Cruz de Mar Pequena-Ifni-Sahara, Madrid, 1941, p.91). Further, the "Arrecife fort, or Casa de Mar" still exists. It may be assumed that it was only the build-

4/ see page 10.

ing along the coast of which the Sultan "destroyed all traces".

Moulay Hassan took the opportunity of his trip to the Far Souss to establish his authority among the tribes. At Goulimine "... he received the Cheikhs and the Maquil Arab notables, who came to express their humble obedience. Neither they, nor their fathers, had seen the Sultan in their region, nor had they ever heard of such an event." (p.338).

- 14) 1880. The Sultan of Morocco sends to Ahmed o. M'Hammed, Emir of Adrar, a delegation bearing gifts and "... a letter in which the Great Believer confirmed Ahmed o. M'Hammed in his functions and congratulated him for his method of administering Adrar." (Ahmadou Mamadou Ba, "L'Emirat de l'Adrar mauritanien de 1872 à 1908, bull. Soc. Gegr. et Archeol., Oran 55th year, t.53, fasc. 190, 1932, T to p., p.21).
- 15) 1901. The Blanchet Mission is held captive in the Adrar, and Cheikh Saad Bouth declares: "Upon arrival to Adrar, I found the inhabitants unanimously decided to either kill the members of the Blanchet Mission, or to escort them to the Sultan of Morocco". (In Ismael Hamet, "Chronique de la Mauritanie senegalaise", Paris 1911, p.268).
- 16) 1905-1907. In the face of French threats of conquering Adrar, the Emir of that region, Sid Ahmed o. Ahmed o. Aida, writes to Coppolani advising him "that his country is under the protection of the Sultan of Morocco, and that he will remain at peace with us as long as we maintain peace with his sovereign." (Gillier, 1926, p.130),

"The Emir of Adrar", writes Gillier (1926, p.138), schemes to stir the attention of the Sultan of Morocco to his Adrar, by presenting it as a rich region and a natural dependence of his empire."

A delegation of Mauritanian chiefs meets at Smara with Cheikh Ma el Ainin, and possibly a representative of the Sultan. (Gillier, 1926, p.139).

"In 1900, Sidi Ahmed Ould Abderrahman departed for Morocco to request that the Sultan send a column of troops to occupy Adrar. However, he only went as far as Seguinet el Hamra where he was stopped by Cheikh Ma el-Ainin, powerful man in that region." (G. Poulet, "Les Maures de L'Afrique Occidentale", Fez, Paris, 1904, p.132).

The Sultan decides to send the Mauritians a political and

military mission to the rescue. It consisted of Moulay Idris, the Sultan's caliph 5/, Caid El Madani, and "a young caid to command the war operation." (Ahmadou Mamadou Ba, 1932, t. to p., p.63).

At Smara, Ma El Ainin introduces Moulay Idris to thousands of Mauritians as "the Caliph of His Majesty the Sultan of Morocco, sent to drive all Christians from Islam's territory." (Ibidem, p.63).

In the autumn of 1906 Moulay Idris, heading a large "mechalla", arrives in Tagant "... to drive out the French and expel them from a country which must be restored to the authority of its legitimate chief." (Gillier, 1926, p.139).

Alluding to the Mauritanian's request for help from the Sultan, Colonel Montane writes thus to the Governor-General, (Gillier, 1926, p.142): "... it is probable that this request was transmitted to the Makhzen in Fez, who, after informing Christians in Morocco (our legation, no doubt), and despite the explanations given by these latter - to the effect that the regions concerned should belong to the first occupant, and that they would claim possession of these regions which previously had belonged to him - the Makhzen declared to his correspondents that he would produce the proof within one year."

Through its Fez legation, 6/, France issued official complaints to the Maghzen. The Moroccan Government replies that Moulay Idris had only one mission: "... that of verifying, on the spot, whether the regions under dispute belonged to Senegal or to the regions which recognized the Cherifian authorities."

"In the event that such would be his conclusion", writes Vizir Ben Sliman to our consul Mr. Gaillard, in January 1907, "he should not, evidently, have declared the Holy War - such folly never entered the mind of any member of the Makzen - but he should have furnished the necessary information to the Fez Court. The Sultan then would have been in a position to open courteous negotiations with the French Government to establish boundaries for the respective zones of authority." (Gillier, 1926, p.144-145).

5/, 6/. see page 10.

Martin (1923, p.429) adds another detail: "The Moroccan Government, supported by its German counsellors, recognizes the miss-ion of Moulay Idris, and is even astonished that outsiders are trying to meddle in the internal affairs of its empire. This attitude evidently had not been foreseen".

Gillier (1926, p.146) quotes from a circular distributed to the Zaouias, stating that the Germans proposed to intervene "... if it were proved that the Sultan was the master of the region under dispute". *Z/*.

Odette de Puigaudeau, "Tagant, le siège de Tijikha par Ch. Ma el Ainin et le Chérif marocain", 1906, p.178, Ed. Julliard, Paris 1949. Presently at the author's.

Id. La Piste, (Maroc-Sénégal), Plon, Paris, 1954, "Cheikh Ma el Ainin et la colonne Mouret à Smara", 1913, ch.11.

In the same work, "frontières Maroc-Mauritanie", p.88, p.115, (La Piste) reached Bir Moghrein in P.K. Rosso in 1399. "There were joined the Moroccan-Algerian borders, p.123: the frontier was established by the 25th parallel... Agreement between the Protectorate and French West Africa established certain entry rights over the border, and even administrative rights as far as Fort Gouraud."

It should be noted that passports for travellers coming from Morocco were validated at Fort Gouraud by the officer delegated to the Protectorate Administration by French West Africa, and that Mauritanian nomad groups were not allowed north of Fort Gouraud.

Z/ see page 10

- 1/ - Mourad Tefpahi translation, St. Louis, 1953, p.10-11, Perrot d'Ablancourt, Paris 1.667, t.I, preface 47/, t.III, p.7 and 62. On the same subject, see R. Mauny's "L'expédition marocain d'ouadane (Mauritanie)", bull. "Ifran", WI Nos. 1 and 2, 1949, p.129-140.
- 2/ - "Esquisse d'une histoire du Sahara Occidental", Hesperis XI, 1930 1931/, p.35-95; t. to p.161.
- 3/ - Commander Gillier's "La pénétration en Mauritanie", Paris 1926, XII + 359, p.2 maps.
- 4/ - P. Marty's "L'Emirat des Trarzas", coll. "Revue du Monde Musulman". XXXVI, 1917, 1918 1919/, 483 p., 10 photos, 1 map, fac-similes.
- 5/ - At times referred to as the nephew, other times as the cousin, or the uncle of Sultan Moulay Hafid.
- 6/ - Gillier, 1926, p.144; Martin, 1923, p.429 quotes: "Tangier".
- 7/ - See "le livre jaune du Maroc, 1907" on such matters.

Ene. to desp. 1105
from London

KINGDOM OF MOROCCO
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
ROYAL MOROCCAN EMBASSY
65 Ennismore Gardens, London, SW.7
PHONE: KNI.8827 Ext.4

No.2

STATEMENTS AND DOCUMENTS

OCTOBER 1958

NOTE FROM THE PERMANENT SECRETARIAT OF MAURITANIA AND THE SAHARA (in Rabat) ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT

The Permanent Secretariat of Mauritania and the Sahara created on the occasion of the conference which grouped together all the representatives of Mauritania and the Sahara (Rio de Oro, Seguier-El-Hamra and Tindouf) which took place in Rabat on September 3, 4, and 5th, 1958 being aware of the request for a loan made by the MIFERMA Company, with the backing of the French Government, to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, with a view to mining the iron ore of Mauritania (Fort Gouraud) wishes to draw the attention of the President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development to the following facts:

1. - The delegates to the above-mentioned conference after having restated that Mauritania and the Sahara are integral parts of Morocco;
 - expressed their inflexible determination to liberate themselves from the foreign domination which is forced upon them and to re-integrate their Mother-country Morocco;
 - taken into consideration the vital part played by the Army of Liberation in the achievement of the aspirations of the peoples of those regions;
 - passed by a unanimous vote the following resolution:

"Assembled in conference at Rabat on the 3, 4 and 5th of September, 1958 the representatives of Mauritania and the Sahara proclaim:

- that the riches of the Sahara and Mauritania are the birth-right of their inhabitants;
- that no foreign nations may appropriate for itself the right to exploit these riches;
- warns foreign companies and international institutions against

- all agreements with the occupying forces for the exploitation of these riches, exploitation which, in these circumstances, would be detrimental to the interests of the inhabitants;
- declare that they do not recognize agreements concluded between the colonial powers and these companies and institutions, and are determined to oppose, by all possible means, the implementation of such agreements."
2. Since the end of the Protectorate in Morocco, the peoples of Mauritania have been struggling for freedom to reunite their territories with Morocco, the Mother-country, under the guidance of His Majesty King Mohammed V.
 3. In spite of 40 years of foreign occupation, the peoples of Mauritania have never ceased to look upon their lands as an integral part of the Kingdom of Morocco, not only historically and geographically, but also from an ethnic and religious viewpoint.
 4. The representatives of the Mauritanian peoples have solemnly declared, on several occasions, their unshakable determination to fortify the will of the people to continue the struggle until they achieve their legitimate aspirations.
 5. The stability and safety of the region, sine qua non conditions for economic development will not be achieved until the political problem has been solved.
 6. At a time when all colonial countries are progressing naturally towards their liberation with the support of great international organisations and notably by the United Nations, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development cannot give a favourable reply to MIFERMA, without seriously prejudicing the aspirations of the Mauritanian peoples and the rights of His Majesty's Government.
 7. By agreeing to the request of a loan made by a colonial enterprise, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development instead of following the political evolution of colonial peoples towards their liberation and emancipation, would be allowing itself to be involved with colonialism, which at the present time is out of date.
 8. The Permanent Secretariat of Mauritania and the Sahara draws the attention of the President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development to the consequences which might

result from the granting of a loan to the MIFERMA Company or to any other colonial enterprise for the exploitation of the riches of Mauritania against the wishes of its people.

9. In order to give weight to their request the colonial authorities may point to the results of the French Referendum on September 28th, 1958. In a resolution of the Conference of Mauritania and the Sahara held at Rabat, the representatives of these regions took an unequivocal stand on this point:

"that France has no authority whatsoever to submit a referendum or other negotiations in Mauritania or the Sahara, inasmuch as these regions are foreign to France and unquestionably belong to the Moroccan community;

that negotiations in these regions, as a consequence of the French colonial regime, are constantly pre-arranged and falsified so that they do not express the decisions or the aspirations of the populations. Our misgivings have, thus, been completely confirmed as to the pre-arrangement, and the proof of force, on which the French referendum was based in these regions."

10. The Government of His Majesty has, on its own behalf, in notes of protest, brought to the attention of the President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and to the attention of all the Executive Directors, the disagreement between Morocco and France over the Mauritanian question.

11. The Government of His Majesty has, in the same notes of protest, made the strictest reservations in the event of the granting of the loan requested by the MIFERMA Company by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, disclaiming by these notes, all responsibility as to future consequences.

12. Moreover, the Government of His Majesty and the French Government, as soon as the Protectorate was ended, recognized and agreed officially to negotiate the problems of Morocco's frontiers, and in order to do this a Franco-Moroccan Commission was appointed. We believe that the solution of this problem is a necessary preliminary to all commercial enterprises.

13. After the liberation of these regions and the settlement of the Franco-Moroccan dispute over the Mauritanian question, the peoples of Mauritania filled with a sincere spirit of co-operation, hope when the time is ripe, to be able to prove

their good-will and their desire to facilitate the opening up of the mineral wealth of their country, for the good of all.

Signed: HORMA OULD BABANA

Former Member of Parliament for Mauritania.
Former President of the General Council of Mauritania.
Former Member of the Grand Council of French Occidental Africa.
Political Director of the "Entente Mauritanienne".

MOHAMED FALL O. OUMEIR

Emir of Trarza.
Councillor General for Trarza.
Member of the High Commission of the Sahara.

DEY O. SIDI BABA

Former Minister of Commerce, of Industry and Mines in Mauritania.
Former Councillor General of Mauritania.
Former Member of the Grand Council of French Occidental Africa.
Assistant Director of "Entente Mauritanienne".

MOHAMED EL MOKTAR

Former Inspector of Arab Education in Mauritania.
Former Minister of Education in Mauritania.

RABAT, October 10, 1958.

771.022/3-1059

CS/B

March 10, 1959

OFFICIAL-INFORMAL
CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Charlie:

The Navy has brought to my attention a report (Serial 06, 14 January, 1959) from your Naval Attaché to the Chief of Naval Operations which contains the following paragraph:

"3. The Naval Attaché has met with the Director of the Merchant Marine, the Moroccan representative to the April conference in Geneva, in an effort to better understand the Moroccan position on the Territorial Waters question. It was learned that the Government of Morocco is strongly in favor of the 12-mile Territorial Water limits for fishing; that within 2-3 months a new Dahir (law) will be enacted setting down a 12-mile Territorial Water limit from the point of view of fishing."

*XR
871.245*

The thought that a new law setting down a 12-mile territorial sea will be enacted is most disturbing, even though it be limited to fishing, as this report suggests. As you know, it is the position of the US that sovereignty and fishing are two quite independent matters; that fishery jurisdiction can and should be handled without reference to sovereignty.

I hope that you and the Naval Attaché will give us any further information that may be developed on this subject and that you both may find an opportunity to do what you can to sell our point of view.

As of

The Honorable
Charles W. Host,
American Embassy,
Rabat, Morocco

771.022/3-1059
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1) [REDACTED]
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✓ [REDACTED] 3/9/1959

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S/S-CR
MAR 9 1959 P.M.

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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

771-022/6-1559

FROM : AmConsulate General, TANGIER

192
DESP. NO.

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

June 15, 1959

DATE

REF :

JUN 21 1959

MADRID

67 For Dept. Use Only	ACTION REC'D 6/26	DEPT. N F O OTHER RMR-2 IRE-8 EUR-5 ID-4 C109-10 USIA-10 Army-4 Navy-3 AIR-1

SUBJECT: An Incident at Peñon de Velez de la Gomera

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771-022/6-1559

For several hundred years Ceuta and Melilla have been points of Spanish sovereignty on the Mediterranean coast of North Africa in what would otherwise have been parts of the sovereign and independent Kingdom of Morocco. In addition to these two principalities, the Spaniards similarly hold pinpoints of sovereignty along the Moroccan coast called Peñon de Velez de la Gomera (the Moroccans call it Bades Island), Peñon de Alhucemas, and Islas Chafarinas. The first two are now military garrisons, while the latter are islands peopled by a few fishermen.

A few weeks ago Peñon de Velez was the recipient of a bit of attention from the Foreign Ministries at Madrid and Rabat. At certain times of the year it virtually becomes a peninsula instead of an island. In 1952 the Spaniards had taken advantage of this fact to erect a landmark on the mainland facing Peñon de Velez, reminding the world that Spanish territory began there.

While in Alhucemas on May 29, the reporting officer heard Moroccan Governor BEN LARBY's version of the incident of a few weeks ago. The Spanish commander of the garrison had undertaken to string barbed wire across the neck of the peninsula. The Moroccan population complained to Governor Ben Larby who registered his objection with the Spaniards. Whereupon the Spanish military commander explained that the strip of sand linking the island to the shore is Spanish and that the Moroccans have never objected to the presence of the landmark. The Moroccan Governor replied that the Moroccans thought the monument was some sort of a commemorative one, and that during the Protectorate the caid might even have invited them to come further into Morocco. He stated that there is strong support under international law for the view that an island which becomes a peninsula by accretion belongs to the owner of the mainland. He refused to discuss the matter further with anyone except an appropriate consular officer, but not before telling the Spanish commander that he could attack if he wished. Spanish Vice Consul ROBLES arrived from Nador and made a strong defense of the Spanish commander's position. Governor Ben Larby was looking down his throat, having received word from Rabat that the Foreign Ministry in Madrid had ordered the Spanish commander to remove the wire. The Governor, in recalling that the Spanish Vice Consul had not returned for a second interview that had been planned. Subsequently, the Spaniards removed the wire.

Two days later the Spanish Vice Consul Robles gave the reporting officer his version of the incident. The wire had been strung to prevent Spanish soldiers from bathing in Moroccan waters and to stop Moroccan farmers from selling farm products

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23 JUL 8 1959
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Page 2 of

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Desp. No. 192

From TANGIER

on the island. Governor Larby had been quite critical of Spain during the whole affair, he complained, but of course Spain has no intention of starting a war over such a piece of land. The incident was the result of a misunderstanding on the part of the Moroccans. Since the interview Governor Larby's attitude has changed considerably, according to Vice Consul Robles, as the Governor now admits that Spain is a very good friend of Morocco. In any event, Robles said, it is possible that the Spanish and Moroccan Governments will take up this question either in Rabat or Madrid.



Leo G. Cyr
American Consul General

cc: AmEmbassy, RABAT
AmCongen, CASABLANCA

Dept. please pass AmEmbassy, MADRID

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4P

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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : AmEmbassy, Rabat

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DESP. NO.

771.022/12-2959

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

December 29, 1959

DATE

REF : Embdes 251

JAN 12 1960

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SUBJECT: Municipal & Rural Communes in Morocco

Bulletin Officiel No. 2460 of December 18, 1959, carries the following correction to the decree No. 2-59-1834 of December 2, 1959 creating and listing the urban and rural communes of Morocco (refdes).

District (Cercle) of Sidi Bennour

Instead of "11" read "9"

Instead of "Sebt Beni-Mellal" read "Sebt de Beni Hellal"

District of Fkih ben Salah

After:

"Fkih ben Salah" 11

read:

"Souk el Had des Ouled Benmoussa", 11"
"Dar ould Zidouh, 9"

District of Azilal

Instead of: "Tamannt" read "Tanannt"

District of Imi-n - Tanmoute

Instead of "Taoulokoult" read "Taouloukoult"

District of Sebala

Instead of "Rio Martil" read "Martil"

District of Al Huceima

Instead of "Huceima" read "Hoceima"

Instead of "Ville d'Al Huceima" read Ville d'Al Hoceima, 11".

District of Beni Ouriarhel

Izimmouren instead of "11" read "9"

El Arba Taourirt instead of "9" read "11"

POL: PSENASTIAN/jf
REPORTER


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The action office must return this permanent record copy to DC/R files with an endorsement of action taken.

771.022/12-2959

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Page 2 of 2
Encl. No.
Desp. No. 260
From AmEmbassy, Rabat

Beni Bou Ayach instead of "11" read "21"
Amzoughen Khemis Mrabten instead of "21" read "11"
Instead of At Youssef ou Ali, 11 "read "Ait Youssef ou Ali 15"
Beni Hadifa instead of "15" read "11"

District of Targuist

Instead of "8" read "9"
After "Targuist Center 9", add "Targuist 11"
Had de Beni Bounzar instead of "11" read "9"
Tabrannt instead of "9" read "11"
Tahrzoute instead of "11" read "9"
Beni Ammar instead of "9" read "15"
Tleta Ketama instead of "15" read "9"

District of Beni Bou Frah

Tleta des Beni Gmil Mastassa instead of "9" read "11"

District of the Rif

Ville de Nador instead of "11" read "23"

For the Ambassador:



David G. Nes
Counselor of Embassy

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